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AMERICAN MIDWIFERY LITIGATION AND
STATE LEGISLATIVE PREFERENCES FOR
PHYSICIAN-CONTROLLED CHILDBIRTH
STACEYA. TovINo, J.D. *
"If you have the right to die at home, one would think you have the right to
be born at home." 1
From the colonial period to the Great Depression, lay midwives attended a
large proportion of deliveries that occurred in the United States.2 As late as 1900,
midwife-attended home births accounted for approximately one-half of all births in
the United States.3 By 1950, however, physicians attended more than eighty
percent of all deliveries in the hospital setting.4
Historians have analyzed and interpreted birth statistics, medical textbooks,
medical school curricula, minutes of medical society meetings, public health
reports, articles in medical journals and popular magazines, letters from laboring
mothers, diaries of midwives, legislative committee reports, and state legislation to
identify issues of class, race, gender, and professional and economic competition
that may have played a role in physicians' opposition to midwives and the
transition from lay midwife-assisted home births to physician-assisted hospital
births in the United States. 5
This article analyzes and interprets an additional resource: the texts of
historical and recent court opinions that interpret state regulation of lay midwifery
practices. Why did courts consistently defer to legislative findings that high infant
and maternal mortality rates justified stringent regulation of midwives? Why do
Research Professor, Health Law & Policy Institute, University of Houston Law Center; Doctoral
student, Institute for Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch; J.D., University of
Houston Law Center, 1997; B.A., Tulane University, 1994.
1 MARGARET CHARLES SMITH & LINDA JANET HOLMES, LISTEN TO ME GOOD: THE LIFE STORY
OF AN ALABAMA MIDWIFE 143 (1996) (statement by a nurse-midwife currently practicing in Alabama).
2 CHARLOTTE G. BORST, CATCHING BABIES: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CHILDBIRTH, 1870-
1920, at 1 (1995).
3 JUDITH WALZER LEAVIT-I, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILD-REARING IN AMERICA, 1750-1950, 12
(1986).
4 Id. See also BORST, supra note 2, at 1.
5 See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 50 (1982);
JUDY BARRETr LITOFF, AMERICAN MIDWIVES, 1860 TO THE PRESENT 64 (1978); Eugene R. Declercq
and Richard Lacroix, The Immigrant Midwives of Lawrence, 59 BULLETIN OF THE HISTORY OF MED.
232 (1985); Charlotte G. Borst, Wisconsin's Midwives as Working Women: Immigrant Midwives and
the Limits of a Traditional Occupation, 1870-1920, 8 J. AM. ETHNIC HISTORY 26 (1969); LAUREL
THATCHER ULRICH, A MIDWIFE'S TALE: THE LIFE OF MARTHA BALLARD, BASED ON HER DIARY, 1785-
1812 (1991).
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courts continue to uphold statutory requirements for physician supervision of
midwives and statutes that restrict the practice of lay midwifery? To answer these
questions, this article analyzes the history of the regulation of lay midwifery, as
well as judicial opinions interpreting such regulation, in Alabama, Massachusetts,
and California. 6 Part I of this article generally discusses the history of lay
midwifery in the United States, emphasizing the transition from home births
attended by lay midwives to hospital births attended by physicians. Part II provides
an overview of the legal regulation of lay midwifery in the United States. Parts III,
IV, and V discuss the history of the practice and regulation of lay midwifery in
Alabama, Massachusetts, and California, as well as judicial opinions interpreting
these states' frequently changing regulatory schemes. Parts III, IV, and V also
place each judicial opinion within the historical context of the regulation of
midwifery in the particular state and the United States as a whole. Part VI attempts
to interpret the judicial opinions in light of issues relating to professional and
economic competition, class, race, and gender. This article concludes that a
confluence of forces likely has resulted in the judiciaries' continued deference to
state legislative preferences for physician-controlled childbirth and stringent
regulation of midwives.
6 Research revealed many legal decisions issued by courts in states other than Alabama,
Massachusetts and California. See, e.g., Sammon v. New Jersey Bd. of Med. Examiners, 66 F.3d 639
(3d Cir. 1995); Spears v. Circuit Court, 517 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1975); Dickerson v. Stuart, 877 F. Supp.
1556 (M.D. Fla. 1995); People v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1991); Peckmann v. Thompson, 745 F.
Supp. 1388 (C.D. I11. 1990); Milton v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 579 So. 2d 337
(Fla. App. 1991); Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Petty-Eiftert, 443 So. 2d 266 (Fla. App. 1983);
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. McTigue, 387 So. 2d 454 (Fla. App. 1980); People ex
rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 786 N.E.2d 139 (I11. 2003); People v. Zimmerman, 63 N.E.2d 850 (I11. 1945);
People v. Wedding, 147 Ill. App. 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1909); People v. Arendt, 60 Ill. App. 89 (I11. App. Ct.
1895); People v. Jihan, 519 N.E.2d 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. App.
1984); State v. Bowden, 55 So. 2d 764 (La. 1951); Hunter v. State, 676 A.2d 968 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996); People v. Hildy, 286 N.W. 819 (Mich. 1939); State ex rel. Mo. State Bd. v. Southworth, 704
S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1986); Barresi v. Biggs, 196 N.Y.S. 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); Firman v. State Bd.
of Med., 697 A.2d 291 (Pa. 1987); Leggett v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1980); Pavek v. State, 737 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Banti v. State, 289 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1956). This article focuses on Alabama, Massachusetts, and California because historical
accounts of the practice of midwifery in these states were readily available and because these states have
diverse regulatory schemes. Although Massachusetts is known for its physicians' aggressive opposition
to midwifery and its relatively early (1894) statutory ban of the practice of lay midwifery, Alabama
allowed lay midwives who had obtained permits to attend home deliveries until 1976. Somewhere near
the middle of the regulatory spectrum, California only regulated nurse-midwives until 1993, when the
California Legislature passed a statute specifically permitting the licensed practice of lay midwifery,
which still exists today. See Parts 111, IV, and V, infra. An analysis of every jurisdiction's court
opinions addressing the regulation of midwifery is beyond the scope of this article, but would be an
interesting and worthwhile topic for future research.
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I. HISTORY OF LAW MIDWIFERY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Social Era of Childbirth
Midwives delivered a large proportion of the babies born in the United States
from the colonial period to the Great Depression. 7 During the colonial period,
childbirth was a "social ' 8 or "communal" 9 event, not a medical event. Women
relatives, friends, and neighbors, as well as midwives, attended, served, and
assisted the laboring mother during her delivery.1 0 Most colonial period midwives
began their practices by watching deliveries until they gradually assumed a more
active role and "performed" as midwives when the usual midwife was delayed or
was willing to allow a new midwife to perform. 11  Even colonial period
descriptions of the three stages of childbirth were in social, rather than medical or
biological, terms. 12 The midwife arrived first,13 followed by the women friends
and neighbors of the laboring mother, 14 and, finally, the after-nurse. 15 Physician
participation in childbirth during the colonial period was limited to only the most
difficult births, including cases in which a physician and his instruments were
needed to retrieve "lost" fetuses. 16
Social healers, including midwives, were closely identified with their patients
and moved "in and out of sickrooms unannounced, as though their presence there
were the most ordinary thing in the world-as it was." 17 They developed personal
affiliations and built local reputations. 18 Eighteenth-century physician writers
7 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 99. See also Eric H. Christianson, Medicine in New England, in
SICKNESS & HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 47,
64 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers, eds., 3rd ed. 1997) (noting that contemporary records
suggest that male doctors did not even begin to challenge the monopoly of female midwives until after
1750).
8 See, e.g., ULRICH, supra note 5, at 12 (explaining that the late eighteenth century "was the era of
social childbirth,' when female relatives and neighbors, as well as midwives, attended births.").
9 Deborah Kuhn McGregor, "Childbirth-Travels " and "Spiritual Estates: " Anne Hutchinson and
Colonial Boston, 1634-1639, in I CHILDBIRTH: CHANGING IDEAS AND PRACTICES IN BRITAIN AND
AMERICA, 1600 TO THE PRESENT: MIDWIFERY THEORY AND PRACTICE 180 (Philip K. Wilson ed., 1996)
(noting that "[c]hildbirth in seventeenth-century America was a communal event which women
governed and shared.").
10 ULRICH, supra note 5, at 12.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 184-85.
13 Id.
14 See id. The arrival of the laboring mother's relatives and friends generally signified the
"imminence" of birth. Midwife Martha Ballard "explicitly linked a new intensity of labor with the
summoning of the neighbors, writing that one woman's 'illness came on so great that her women were
called."' Id.
15 Id. at 183.
16 Suzanne Hope Suarez, Midwifery Is Not the Practice of Medicine, 5 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 315,
325-26 (1993) (discussing the elimination of the American Midwife). See also ULRICH, supra note 5, at
59 (explaining that, "Unlike the surgeons of an earlier era, who were called only in dire emergencies,
usually to dismember and extract an irretrievably lost fetus, late-eighteenth-century physicians
considered it appropriate to officiate at an ordinary delivery.").
17 ULRICH, supra note 5, at 61.
18 Id. at 61.
2004]
HeinOnline -- 11 Cardozo Women's L.J. 63 2004-2005
CARDOZO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
repeatedly referred to the laboring mother's attendants (the relatives, friends, and
neighbors who were summoned) as "friends," which suggests that these women
could "identify with their patients in ways that the male physicians could not." 19
There is "[little wonder that some physicians actively resented their presence." 20
Few drugs and rudimentary surgical instruments were available to physicians
during the eighteenth century. 2 1 The technological simplicity of early medicine
resulted in the ability of male physicians to offer little that could not also be offered
by social healers.22 Accordingly, eighteenth-century midwives and physicians
"sought--and generally achieved-similar results."2 3 A "system of cooperation"
and "professional courtesy"24 existed between midwives and physicians for most of
the eighteenth century. For example, author Laurel Thatcher Ulrich explains how
Maine midwife Martha Ballard was invited to attend and observe an autopsy in
1789, which suggests that the local physicians may have considered her one player
in the larger medical community, even if she was a subordinate player.2 5
B. The New Physician Obstetrics
Although male physicians entered the practice of obstetrics in the United
States as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, 26 many of these
physicians devoted only a portion of their professional lives to the practice of
medicine. Significant time remained devoted to other occupations, such as land
proprietorship and politics. 27 , Despite the male physicians' multiple occupations,
some American women began to think that the men could provide services that
midwives could not. Early nineteenth-century American physicians who had
trained in Great Britain had access to education that social healers did not, and
American physicians who did not train in Europe but were apprenticed-trained
"carried with them the status advantages of their gender and of the popular image
of superior education," 28 along with the ability to administer opium and use
forceps, which promised improved health outcomes in the short term.2 9 For
example, William Shippen, a British-trained physician, administered opium to
19 Id. at 65.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 54.
22 Id.
23 ULRICH, supra note 5, at 58.
24 Id at 61 ("From the doctors' point of view, inviting midwives to observe [autopsies] was
perhaps a professional courtesy, a way of including them in an important educational event.").
25 Id at 54.
26 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 38. In 1762, William Shippen returned from studying in London and
Edinburgh and developed a series of midwifery lectures to train both female midwives and male
physicians. Later, Shippen's lectures were limited to male students. Although Shippen may have been
the most famous physician to have practiced midwifery in the eighteenth century, Shippen was not alone
in history. Id. at 39. For example, Franklin Martin, for example, attended many deliveries during his
training at Mercy Hospital in Chicago in the 1870's. Id. at 75.
27 Id, at 59.
28 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 39.
29 Id.
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relieve a laboring American woman's suffering during a footling presentation of a
1795 birth.30
The minority of physicians who did receive formal medical training in the
early nineteenth century attempted to elevate the prestige of their new specialty by
emphasizing the importance of anatomy and physiology, although complications
erupted in their practices. 3 1 These complications were due in part to interventions,
including bloodletting, drugs, and forceps. 32 Inexperienced physicians sometimes
used forceps unnecessarily, excessively, or inappropriately, which caused, among
other conditions, severe perineal tears, cervical lacerations, recto and vesico-
vaginal fistulas, infections, and fetal damage. 33 However, many women still
believed that medical progress would eventually lead to reductions in birth dangers
and pain.34
C. The Exclusivity of the Medical Profession
In 1820, a Harvard Medical School professor published an anonymous
treatise in which he argued that women's characters would be ruined if they
became familiar with medical instruction, including dissections:
It is needless to go on to prove this; it is obvious that we cannot instruct
women as we do men in the science of medicine; we cannot carry them
into the dissecting room and the hospital; many of our more delicate
feelings, much of our refined sensibility must be subdued, before we can
submit to the sort of discipline required in the study of medicine; in
females they must be destroyed; and I venture to say that a female could
scarce pass through the course of education requisite to prepare her, as she
ought to be prepared, for the practice of midwifery, without destroying
those moral qualifies to character, which are essential to the office.35
The professor's argument that women should not be instructed as men
suggests that the eighteenth-century system of cooperation and professional
courtesy between midwives and physicians was giving way to the exclusiveness of
the medical profession in the nineteenth century. Unlike earlier physicians who
maintained multiple occupations as proprietors, politicians, and physicians, 36
nineteenth-century physicians began practicing medicine full-time.37 Although the
30 Id. Footling presentation is defined as the "presentation of the fetus in labor with one of both
feet prolapsed into the vagina." Id. at 274.
31 Id. at 43.
32 Id.
33 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 43-57. See also Diana Scully, From Natural to Surgical Event, in THE
AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH 52, (Pamela S. Eakins ed., 1986) (discussing the dangers associated with
inappropriately used forceps during delivery).
34 LEAvITr, supra note 3, at 58.
35 See ULRICH, supra note 5, at 251 (quoting Walter Channing, REMARKS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF
FEMALES AS PRACTITIONERS IN MIDWIFERY (1820)).
36 See ULRICH, supra note 5, at 59-60.
37 Id. at 177 ("For Martha Ballard the behavior of Dr. Page was particularly troubling. The young
man was not yet twenty-four years old and still unmarried, yet he seemed bent on making midwifery a
2004]
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younger physicians may have saved some women from the dire consequences of
complicated labors, a laboring woman's chances of survival did not, on the whole,
increase during the nineteenth century.38
Factors contributing to the change from cooperation and professional
courtesy between midwives and physicians to medical exclusivity in the nineteenth
century were not only "fashion and forceps" 39 but as demonstrated by the Harvard
Medical professor's treatise: (1) changing notions of womanhood; (2) a new kind
of male professionalism based on the full-time practice of medicine; and (3) a
unified system of medicine in which "ordinary" and "emergency" practices
merged. 40 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich concludes that these factors:
[D]emanded the elimination or further subordination of social healers. To
allow a woman to continue to practice midwifery, or, by extension, any
other form of independent healing, deprived male doctors of the experience
they needed and at the same time perpetuated the notion that un-educated
people could safely care for the sick.4 1
Although physicians increasingly attended the deliveries of women around
the turn of the century, many individuals still believed that no difference existed
between the skill of the male physician and the midwife. 42 When J. Whitridge
Williams, an obstetrics professor at Johns Hopkins Medical School, reviewed the
School's obstetrics curriculum in 1912, he concluded that, "the average
practitioner, through his lack of preparation for the practice of obstetrics, may do
his patients as much harm as the much-maligned midwife.",43 Thus, obstetrical
skill and the application of general obstetrical principles varied widely depending
on the practitioner and his or her training.44
In the late nineteenth-century, the "old and the new" continued to mingle in
birthing rooms.4 5 Although laboring women invited male physicians into their
homes, hoping to benefit from the physicians' new medical expertise and
technology, female relatives and neighbors continued to provide some delivery
assistance.4 6 The status of the late nineteenth-century physician in the mother's
home, vis-t-vis her friends, may have been elevated by the physician's ability to
use the new obstetrical techniques, 47 but tension between the mother's physician
and friends still existed. For example, a Long Island physician armed with
part of the full-time practice of medicine.").
38 Id. at 57.
39 Id. at 180 ("Historians have attributed the rise of 'male-midwifery' in England and America to
two factors, fashion and forceps.").
40 Id. at 254.
41 Id. at 254.
42 BORST, supra note 2, at 1.
43 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 63. Williams discovered that most medical students only had the
opportunity to witness the delivery of one woman during their schooling.
44 Id. at 63.
45 Id. at 59.
46 Id. at 59.
47 Id.
[Vol. 11:61
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information about germ transmission was treated with hostility in 1890 when he
suggested that the women attendants boil his instruments and make a clean bed for
the delivery. 48 The laboring physicians and friends likely compromised on many
procedures until the twentieth century, when "physician-directed obstetrics finally
became master of the birthing room."4 9
D. The Rise of Hospital Births
Midwife-attended home births accounted for approximately one-half of all
births in the United States as late as 1900.50 However, during and after the period
from 1910 to 1930, many women moved to the hospital to deliver their babies.5
1
By 1940, fifty-five percent of births in the United States occurred in the hospital.
52
By 1950, eighty-eight percent of births occurred in the hospital,53 and midwives
attended less than ten percent of all deliveries. 54 After 1950, physicians, including
many who had received special training in obstetrics, attended more than eighty
percent of all deliveries in the United States.5 5 Physician attendance at hospital
deliveries became so prominent that the transition has been described as follows:
In just half a century, allopathic physicians in the United States have
enticed ninety-nine percent of us into their places of business (hospitals)
for childbirth, forced on us a medical model of birth... raised the price of
services.., and lobbied state legislatures for laws that would require us to
submit to their exclusive control during pregnancy and childbirth. 56
The transition to physician-attended hospital deliveries in the twentieth century first
began with middle- and upper-class women and their obstetricians who believed in
new theories regarding germ transmission that theoretically made home birth
difficult to manage. 57 Popular medical journals in the 1920's and 1930's also
encouraged women to deliver their babies in hospitals to ensure the safety of both
mother and child.58 At that same time, specialists (vis-A-vis general practitioners)
attempted to monopolize obstetrical cases, and hospital-based obstetricians
aggressively managed childbirth by using pain-relieving drugs, labor inducers, and
other technological interventions. 59  By the second wave of the women's
movement in the 1960's, American physicians had established a near-monopoly on
48 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 60.
49 Id. at 61.
5o Id. at 12. Around 1900, the number of physician-attended deliveries increased and
approximately equaled the number of midwife-attended deliveries. Id. After 1900, the number of
physician-attended deliveries increased while the number of midwife-attended deliveries decreased. Id.
51 Id. at 82.
52 LEAVITr, supra note 3, at 171.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id. See also BORST, supra note 2, at 1.
56 Suarez, supra note 16, at 315.
57 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 173.
58 Id at 178.
59 Id. at 179-80.
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childbirth, 60 although the percentage of out-of-hospital births did increase slightly
to approximately one percent of all births by 1975.61
The trends described in the preceding paragraphs did not apply to all
populations in the United States. For example, the black population in the South,
as well as the immigrant population that came to the United States at the end of the
nineteenth century, 62 delivered a greater proportion of babies at home in the
attendance of midwives for a longer period of time. 63 Part III, infra, which
discusses the regulation and practice of lay (and mostly black) midwives in
Alabama in the middle of the twentieth century, as well as Part IV, infra, which
begins with a story about turn-of-the-century Massachusetts midwife Hanna Porn,
will illustrate departures from these national statistics.
II. CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF MIDWIFERY IN THE UNITED STATES
Each state64 has the power to regulate the midwives who practice in that
state, and most states have enacted laws that identify whether the practice of
midwifery is permitted, prohibited, or restricted. 65  In addition, most states
distinguish between "lay" midwives, also referred to as "direct-entry,"
"independent," or "granny" midwives [hereinafter lay midwives], and nurse-
midwives [hereinafter nurse-midwives]. 66 Lay midwives generally do not have
60 George W. Lowis & Peter G. McCaffery, Sociological Factors Affecting the Medicalization of
Midwifery, in MIDWIFERY AND THE MEDICALIZATION OF CHILDBIRTH: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 24
(Edwin Van Teijlingen et al. eds., 2000).
61 Pamela S. Eakins, Out-of-Hospital Birth, in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BIRTH 218 (Pamela S.
Eakins ed., 1986).
62 Lowis & McCaffery, supra note 60, at 21.
63 Indeed, in 1935, although only five percent of white pregnant women were attended by
midwives, fifty-four percent of black pregnant women were attended by midwives. By 1953, both
races' use of midwives dropped: only three percent of white women, and twenty percent of black
women, were attended by midwives during their deliveries. Id. at 24.
64 Although state statutes and regulations generally regulate midwives, the Federal Government has
recognized the practice of midwifery by allowing its insurance plans, including the Medicaid Program
and the Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) Program, to
provide reimbursement for professional services rendered by midwives. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d
(Medicaid permits reimbursement of midwives); 10 U.S.C.A. § 1079 (CHAMPUS permits
reimbursement of midwives).
65 Other schemes that prohibit or restrict the practice of midwives include the: (1) denial or
restriction of reimbursement by third party insurers; (2) denial or limitation of hospital admitting
privileges; and (3) restriction of access to physician affiliation. See Barbara A. McCormick,
Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman's Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 674 (1983)
(discussing the various schemes that restrain the trade of midwives). These schemes generally are
beyond the scope of this article. However, the restriction of access to physician affiliation is briefly
discussed in Part V, which addresses California obstetricians' failure to formally agree to supervise
licensed midwives, as required to permit lay midwives to practice under the California Licensed
Midwifery Practice Act of 1993. For a thorough discussion of the antitrust implications of the denial of
hospital privileges to nurse-midwives, see Brenda J. Glaser-Abrams, Hospital Privileges for Nurse-
Midwives: An Examination Under Anti-Trust Law, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 959 (1984).
66 The Midwives Alliance of North America (MANA) categorizes midwives as lay midwives,
certified nurse-midwives, or certified professional midwives. Lay midwives usually have no formal
education in the field of childbirth, but have gained proficiency in birthing through practice and
apprenticeship pursuant to which they share a fund of common knowledge from more experienced
midwives. Certified nurse-midwives must first acquire a nursing degree and then complete further study
[Vol. 11:61
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nursing degrees; instead, they have gained proficiency in birthing through practice
and apprenticeship 67 Although lay midwives historically relied on self-education
and apprenticeship, many lay midwives today combine apprenticeship with some
type of training at a school for lay midwives, like the Seattle Midwifery School.
6 8
Certified nurse-midwives, on the other hand, must first acquire a nursing
degree and then complete further study in standard gynecology and obstetrics
before they may attend deliveries. Although certified nurse-midwives are expressly
permitted to work in all fifty states, certified nurse-midwives generally practice
only in institutional settings under the direct control of physicians due to state
statutory and regulatory constraints. For example, as discussed in more detail in
Part IV, infra, Massachusetts only permits certified nurse-midwives to work under
the supervision of a licensed physician in licensed health care facilities.
Thus, each state regulates the practice of lay midwifery differently. States
usually regulate the practice of midwifery under the auspices of specific nurse-
midwife licensure acts, although some states do so more generally through their
medical practice acts, and other states do so more specifically through new lay
midwifery licensure acts. As will become evident in Parts III, IV, and V, infra, the
primary stated justification for state regulation of lay midwives is the protection of
the public from unqualified, incompetent practitioners.
Although both lay and nurse-midwives have challenged the constitutionality
of various state regulatory provisions, the courts, with few exceptions, 69 have
in standard gynecology and obstetrics. Thus, certified nurse-midwives obtain formal training in both
nursing and midwifery from an educational program accredited by the American College of Nurse-
Midwives Certification Council (ACC) and must pass the ACC examination prior to being licensed.
Importantly, certified nurse-midwives are expressly permitted to work in all fifty states. Although
certified nurse-midwives are recognized in every state, they generally practice only in institutional
settings under direct control of physicians due to state statutory and regulatory constraints. Finally,
certified professional midwives gain their midwifery education through a variety of routes, but they
must have their midwifery skills and experience evaluated through the North American Registry of
Midwives (NARM) certification process and pass the NARM Written Examination and Skills
Assessment. For a further discussion of the different categories of midwives, see, e.g., Susan Corcoran,
To Become a Midwife: Reducing Legal Barriers to Entry into the Midwifery Profession, 80 WASH. U. L.
Q. 649, 653 (2002); Kathlyn Marie Happe, Is California Edging Towards a "Consultive" Relationship
Between Midwives and Physicians, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 713, 715 (2001); Matt Kitzi, Can Missouri
Catch Up? Why Missouri Laws Work Unconstitutional Discrimination Against Lay Midwives and What
can be Done to Stop it?, 67 UMKC L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1998); Midwives Alliance of North America,
Categories of Professional Midwives, at http://www.mana.org/definitions.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2003).
67 MARY M. LAY, THE RHETORIC OF MIDWIFERY: GENDER, KNOWLEDGE, AND POWER 4 (2000)
(discussing lay midwives).
68 Id.
69 In those cases in which the regulation of midwives was not upheld, the courts usually found that
certain administrative regulations promulgated by state agencies were invalid exercises of delegated
legislative authority. See, e.g., Dep't. of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. McTigue, 387 So.2d 454 (Fla.
App. 1980). In McTigue, the Florida appellate court held that certain administrative rules, which
required the supervising physician to be licensed in Florida and required the applicant for the license to
practice midwifery to list the names of patients to be delivered by the midwife, were invalid exercises of
delegated legislative authority. The court specifically reasoned that the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services was not authorized to add or to modify those provisions of the statute that
identified with particularity the criteria that must be satisfied for an individual to be eligible for a license
to practice midwifery.
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upheld the provisions. For example, judges in Massachusetts, 70 New Jersey,7 1
New York, 72 Pennsylvania, 73 and Illinois74 have ruled that the regulation of
midwifery does not violate a midwife's due process rights. In addition, a 1976
California decision refused to extend the constitutional right to privacy, which had
already been established in the areas of procreation and abortion, to an expectant
mother's choice of the manner and circumstances in which her baby would be born,
including her choice of childbirth attendants. 75 Moreover, a 1987 Massachusetts
decision upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statutory provision that
established certification requirements for nurse-midwives and prohibited nurse-
midwives from attending home births (even though the statute did not similarly
restrict lay midwives) against an equal protection challenge. 76 Finally, courts have
upheld statutes requiring nurse-midwives.to be licensed and to practice only in
certain licensed facilities in the face of challenges based on illegal restraint of trade
under both federal and state anti-trust law. 77
III. ALABAMA: THE PROMINENCE OF BLACK LAY MIDWIVES UNTIL 1976
A. Introduction to Alabama Medicine and Midwifery
When Booker T. Washington arrived in Alabama in 1881, he found no
licensed black physicians, pharmacists, or dentists practicing in the state.78
However, in the mid-1880's, Cornelius Nathaniel Dorsett, a black man, passed
70 Leigh v. Bd. of Registration, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (Mass. 1985), aff'd, 506 N.E.2d 91 (Mass. 1985)
(holding that a Massachusetts statute that regulated nurse midwives did not violate the plaintiff nurse's
due process rights when the Massachusetts Board of Registration disciplined the nurse for violating the
statute by practicing midwifery without having first obtained the proper certification).
71 Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam., 66 F.3d 639 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that a New Jersey
statute regulating midwives did not violate the substantive due process rights of either aspiring midwives
or women who desired to employ midwives in subsequent pregnancies because the statute was rationally
related to New Jersey's legitimate state interests in protecting the health and welfare of mothers and
children).
72 Lange-Kessler v. N.Y. Dept. of Educ., 109 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the New York
Professional Midwifery Practice Act, which requires midwives to obtain a formal education and to enter
into a written practice agreement with a licensed physician or hospital, was rationally related to the
legitimate interest of the State of New York of protecting the health and welfare of mothers and infants).
73 Firman v. Bd. of Med., 697 A.2d 291 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (holding that the likelihood of
erroneous deprivation of a nurse-midwife's property interest in her license was negligible under the
Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act's automatic suspension provisions, which suspended nurse-
midwifery licenses upon conviction of drug-related felonies).
74 People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 786 N.E.2d 139 (I11. 2003) (holding that the Illinois Nursing
and Advanced Practice Nursing Act was designed to protect the health and safety of the public and,
therefore, that the plaintiff, an "alleged" midwife, who was enjoined from continuing her unlicensed
practice of midwifery following a water delivery that resulted in the death of a newborn, was not denied
her liberty and property interest in her employment as a lay midwife).
75 Id.
76 See Leigh, 395 Mass. at 683 (reasoning that Massachusetts stated a legitimate purpose in
assuring a minimal level of training and competence for nurse-midwives as one way to permit
consumers to rely on such board certification when making informed decisions about health care).
77 See id.
78 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 20.
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Alabama's medical licensure examination; 79 and in 1891, the Alabama Medical
Society licensed its first woman physician, Dr. Halle Tanner Dillon Johnson.80
During the nineteenth century, most black women in Alabama delivered their
babies in the attendance of local, usually black, midwives rather than in the
attendance of the few black physicians licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. 81
The use of black midwives appeared to have been influenced by the mothers' rural
isolation, race, and economic situations, not by preference. 82  Indeed, while
speaking at the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Alumnae Association of the
Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania, Dr. Johnson explained that Alabama
families living far from town could not afford care by a physician because most
physicians charged money for travel (two dollars per mile for a visit) in addition to
the cost of medicine. 83 Many of these physicians required payment by cash or
reliable assurances of payment before they would travel to attend to a person who
lived far from town. 84
In addition, many white doctors and hospitals refused to care for poor black
women before desegregation. 85 Although several small hospitals in Birmingham,
Montgomery, Selma, and Tuskegee offered medical care to blacks, black women
who lived in rural areas failed to use these hospitals because they were "unfamiliar,
far away, and costlier than midwife care." 86 Accordingly, most black women in
Alabama relied on local black midwives to attend their deliveries in the nineteenth
century and in the first half of the twentieth century. 87 Although only fifteen
percent of all births in the United States in 1930 were attended by midwives, eighty
percent of those midwives lived in the South, 88 including Alabama.
One black lay midwife who practiced in Alabama throughout the middle of
the twentieth century was Margaret Charles Smith, the subject of the autobiography
Listen to Me Good. The Life Story of an Alabama Midwife, and Alabama's oldest
living midwife in 1996, the date of the book's publication.89 Following the birth of
her first two children, 90 Mrs. Smith began attending births with a lay midwife




82 Id. at 35.
83 Id. at 20.
84 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1.
85 Id. at 104.
86 Id. at 35.
87 Id. at 20-21, 37.
88 See LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 268.
89 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1.
90 Mrs. Smith was born in Eutaw, Alabama, on September 12, 1906. Id. at xvii. Unmarried, Mrs.
Smith gave birth to her first two children in 1922 and 1926, at the ages of sixteen and twenty,
respectively. Id. At the age of thirty-six, Mrs. Smith married her husband, and her third son was born a
year later. Id. at 44.
91 Id. at 75.
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deliveries, Mrs. Smith began attending deliveries of relatives and friends.92 Mrs.
Smith initially used castor oil, lard, and other lubricants to rub the abdomens of
laboring mothers, 93 and other "birthing pharmacopia" including black haw, black
pepper, mayapple root, ginger root, dirt dauber or spider webs, and tread sash tea.
94
B. Lay Midwives and Permits
Although early studies showed that maternal and infant mortality rates were
about the same in the early twentieth-century for black Alabama women whose
deliveries were attended by midwives and white Alabama women whose deliveries
were attended by physicians, black midwives were still associated with high
mortality rates. In 1928, Jessie L. Marriner, the Director of Public Health Nursing
in Alabama, stated that although midwifery was a "time-honored institution in
Alabama," formal midwife education and registration should be required to protect
the public health. 95 Thus, in the early twentieth century, Alabama health officials
initiated efforts to increase access to prenatal care and to regulate midwives.
96
In 1918, the Alabama Legislature enacted a law that required all midwives to
pass an examination and register with the Alabama State Board of Health, which
prompted the Andrew Memorial Hospital in Tuskegee to offer to train Alabama's
black midwives.97 The Tuskegee facility emphasized simple hygiene and domestic
skills including making beds, preparing foods, and giving baths.9 8 Although
thousands of women practiced as lay midwives in Alabama, only a few completed
the required training.99
After years of attending the deliveries of Alabama women without any formal
education or training, Mrs. Smith in 1949 became one of Greene County,
Alabama's last lay midwives to receive training and to receive an official permit for
the practice of midwifery. 10 0 After receiving her training, Mrs. Smith was
recruited by local physicians and became a part of Greene County's public health
team by working in public health prenatal -clinics (including clinics in Boligee,
Tishibe, and Eutaw, Alabama), which provided prenatal care to approximately
twelve percent of Alabama women. 10 1 Mrs. Smith was permitted to attend the
deliveries of clinic patients who had received prenatal care if she received
permission from a clinic physician in the form of a written card that was signed by
92 Id.
93 Id. at 37.
94 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 37-38.
95 Id. at 64.
96 Id. at 63.
97 Id. at 64.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at xvii.
lO Id. at 67. White women accounted for only 2.3 percent of the population of women who
attended the prenatal clinics, "as clinic care was viewed a last resort for poor blacks and a federal
imposition of socialized medicine." Id. at 65.
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the physician:
See, they don't allow midwives to deliver unless the doctor writes out a
statement. My name is signed to the bottom of the card. You can't go
unless they bring the paper to you first. Then, you have the paper, and the
doctor signed it. I'd been trained all along not to fool with somebody
unless a doctor O.K.'d the paper stating that the patient is O.K. for a
midwife. 102
Mrs. Smith's back-up physician, who praised her skills and her rare decisions
to seek physician referrals, was Dr. Ruker Staggers. 10 3 For the twenty-eight year
period between 1949 and 1977, Mrs. Smith worked at the various public health
prenatal clinics and attended the deliveries of hundreds of patients. 104
Although a strong body of American medical opinion opposed to midwives
and their "low status" clients existed, 105 such opinions were not uniformly held.
For example, Mrs. Smith's supervising physicians continually praised her skills and
her excellent health outcomes. One interpretation is that less competitive and more
courteous attitudes grew out of the general southern belief that although midwifery
could not be raised to the level achieved in Europe and, especially, Great Britain,
"it was realistic to aim at requiring minimal acceptable standards of midwifery, and
that this would have to suffice." 106 A second interpretation is that white Alabama
physicians were less competitive with black Alabama midwives whose patients
were mostly poor, black women, because many of these women could not afford to
pay the lower midwife rate, let alone the higher physician rate. According to this
interpretation, physicians had no reason to compete with midwives for patients.
Mrs. Smith's autobiography, which contains a number of references to her
substantial efforts to collect amounts owed her for midwifery services, supports this
interpretation. 107
Although the training provided to Alabama midwives by the government was
very basic, physicians and health authorities favored midwives who had completed
the training. However, many midwives still relied on their own considerable
experiences and skills, not the government training:
Midwives like Mrs. Smith took their new training into their souls, but they
also used skills and knowledge they had acquired in apprenticeships with
102 Id. at 78.
103 Dr. Staggers recalled, "Margaret's babies did awfully well. I can't think of any time when there
was any question about Margaret's babies. But we knew that if Margaret needed us .. .there was
something going on that needed some help." Id. at 88.
104 Id. at 77.
105 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 21.
106 Lowis & McCaffery, supra note 60, at 22. See also LAY, supra note 67, at 61 (noting that most
southerners felt that "if, somehow, midwives could be made to wash their hands and to use silver nitrate
drops for the babies' eyes' that was all that could be expected.").
107 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 75-76 ("Some of the children, I meet them now, they've
grown and gone. Mama ain't [sic] never paid me, Daddy ain't [sic] never paid me. I just give it to
them. I'm short.").
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community midwives. While sometimes counting on miracles in a crisis,
Mrs. Smith recognized that her skills were the bottom line. Training
emphasized reliance on medical backup, but midwives had to be self-
reliant because they faced old barriers: institutional segregation, gender
discrimination, and professional elitism. 10 8
Mrs. Smith herself stated the following with respect to the formal training: "I
took the training courses, but the midwife had already trained me, Ella Anderson....
But everything, everything I learned, I learned from Miss Anderson. See, Miss Ella
Anderson had done learned me, and I didn't forget it." 10 9
In addition to the training, examination, and registration requirements, local
health departments, acting under direction of the Alabama State Board of Health,
also required midwives to adhere to certain rules identified in each local health
department's Manual for Midwifery Training which, among other rules: (1)
required newbom babies to be placed in separate sleeping quarters from their
mothers, even if a cardboard box was the only other option; (2) prohibited the use
of any drugs (including the traditional herbs carried by Mrs. Smith and other
midwives) other than castor oil or another laxative to bring on labor; (3) prohibited
the application of grease to the mother's abdomen or birth canal, reflecting
concerns for reducing infections; and (4) permitted frequent inspections of
midwives' bags for illegal drugs, including teas and roots.110
In 1931, Alabama county health departments supervised the 3,568 Alabama
midwives who, by that time, had completed the required training.111 Many of these
midwives worked in state-sponsored public health prenatal clinics.1 12 These
midwives attended the majority of births by black women as well as an increasing
number of births by white women due in part to the depressed economic conditions
and the laboring mother's preference for midwives. 113
C. Improved Health Outcomes, the "Midwife Problem, "and Racial Inequities
Despite the growing concern of the white Alabama medical establishment
regarding the "midwife problem," many pregnant women benefited from increased
access to maternity care, including the care provided by the midwives who worked
at rural health clinics during the 1930's and 1940's. When the Alabama Bureau of
Maternal and Child Health sponsored a quality-of-care study, it identified positive
108 Id. at 68.
109 Id. at 75.
110 Id. at 87. As officials inspected midwifery bags more frequently, some midwives would prepare
one bag for inspection and another bag that they would actually bring with them when they attended a
delivery. The bag the midwife would bring to deliveries might actually contain, in addition to legal
drugs like castor oil, other oils to be mixed with sugar and turpentine for healing small cuts, as well as
herbal roots. Id. at 87. See also SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 101 (explaining how nurses who
were caught carrying illegal teas in their midwifery bags would be asked to turn in their midwifery
bags).
I 11 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 64.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 65.
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outcomes for the black women enrolled in prenatal clinics whose deliveries were
attended by midwives. 114  The Alabama Medical Journal, in its report of the
quality-of-care study, concluded that:
If we take the two opposite extremes economically and educationally,
namely, the white (non-clinic) patient and the colored clinic patient, it is
rather startling to find the colored rate is lower than the white in maternal
mortality by 9 percent and neonatal mortality by 35 percent, but higher in
stillbirths by 13 percent, probably in the main because of the prevalence of
syphilis in the colored. 1I5
Although black Alabama midwives had earned the respect of both the black
and white women whose deliveries they attended, 116 most white physicians, local
health authorities, and the local medical establishment still refused to recognize
black midwives as health care providers in part because of their race.117 An article
published in Alabama Medical Transactions in 1935 stated, "The midwife problem
becomes more pernicious as the years roll by. We reported last year that the
number of mothers taken care of by midwives was on the increase, and we regret to
say it continues to increase."' 18
One interpretation is that the midwives' fees began to attract the attention of
the medical establishment. According to Mrs. Smith, the nurses at the Alabama
State Board of Health established the fees that the registered midwives could
receive for attending a delivery of a clinic patient. 119 When midwives began
earning sufficient fees, Mrs. Smith believes that the state and the medical
profession's efforts to eliminate the midwives increased: "See, the nurses at the
health department set the prices we got paid. It started off at five, then it went to
ten, to fifteen, to twenty. When it got on up there to fifty, that's when they wanted
the midwives off."'120
At the same time, racial abuses and attitudes of racial superiority were
continuing. For example, Tuskegee sponsored a syphilis blood-testing program for
black men, the result of which was to deny medical treatment to those men who
tested positive for the disease. 12 1 By further example, early twentieth-century
American physicians believed that the high rate of syphilis among Alabama's black
114 Id. at 65-66.
115 Id. at 65-66.
116 Id. at 21.
117 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 21, 23.
118 Id. at 65.
119 Id. at 75.
120 Id, at 76-77.
121 Id. at 66-67. See generally Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, in SICKNESS & HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 392 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers eds., 1997); Raymond A. Vonderlehr
et al., Untreated Syphilis in the Male Negro, 17 VENEREAL DISEASE INFORMATION 260-65 (1936),
reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 390-92
(John Harley Warner & Janet A. Tighe eds., 2001).
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population was the result of excessive sexual desire. 122 With this background of
racial abuses and attitudes, historians argue that the efforts of white physicians and
the medical establishment to eliminate midwives were similarly "clouded" by
attitudes of racial superiority. For example, in the 1940's, white physicians
directed specific campaigns towards white women in an attempt to persuade them
not to have their births attended by black midwives, despite the white women's
respect for the skills of their black midwives. 123 The control of and racial bias
towards Alabama midwives continued later in the twentieth century as well. For
example, in the 1960's and 1970's, black lay midwives were criticized for failing to
use blood pressure cuffs. 124 However, the county health departments, which
included white administrators, physicians, and nurses, refused to train the black
midwives in the use of the blood pressure cuffs on the grounds that only nurses
could use them. 12 5
D. Act 499
Despite lay midwives' safe delivery of thousands of Alabama babies and the
improvement of health outcomes in the women who received prenatal care at the
local health departments' prenatal clinics, the Alabama legislature passed a new
law in 1976 that ended the legal practice of lay midwifery. The relevant portion of
this law [hereinafter Act 499] provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person other than a licensed professional
nurse who has received a license from the State Board of Nursing and the
Board of Medical Examiners to practice nurse midwifery in this state. Any
person violating this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (b)
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed as to prevent lay
midwives holding valid health department permits from engaging in the
practice of lay midwifery as heretofore provided until such time as said
permit may be revoked by the county board of health. 126
Paragraph (a) of Act 499 continued to allow nurse-midwives to practice hospital-
based 127 midwifery in Alabama as long as they obtained and maintained the
appropriate licensure. 128 However, paragraph (b) "grandfathered in" lay midwives
122 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1 at 67; Brandt, supra note 121, at 393.
123 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 21, 67.
124 Id. at 145.
125 Id.
126 ALA. CODE. § 34-19-3 (1976). See also 1976 ALA. ACTS 499.
127 Even nurse midwives were not allowed to plan to attend deliveries at a home. Act 499
specifically states, "All deliveries must be planned to take place in the hospital." Id. § 34-19-8.
128 However, even nurse midwives were not permitted to "undertake the charge of abnormal cases
of confinement or any disease in connection with confinement" or to "perform manipulations of any
kind." See id. §§ 34-19-7 and 34-19-8. Indeed, nurse midwives were only permitted to attend cases of"normal childbirth." Id. § 34-19-8. Act 499 defines "normal childbirth" as "[d]elivery, at or close to
term, of a pregnant woman whose physical examination by a physician reveals no abnormalities." Id. §
34-19-2(3). Moreover, if the laboring mother does not deliver her baby within a "reasonable time," the
nurse midwife is required to notify a qualified physician immediately and must "make no effort to
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who had been issued permits by local boards of health and allowed them to
continue to engage in the practice of lay midwifery, but only "until such time as
said permit may be revoked by the-county board of health." 129 Accordingly, to the
extent the local boards of health refused to renew lay midwives' old permits, or to
issue new permits, lay midwives' practices became illegal.
Indeed, lay midwives' non-underground practices all but ended within five
years of the passage of Act 499.130 "[C]ounty health departments made renewal of
lay midwife permits extremely difficult." 13 1 Some physicians refused to sign lay
midwives' new permits, and some local health boards effectively retired currently
registered lay midwives by refusing to renew their registrations. 132 No Alabama
county health department issued a lay midwife permit after 1977.133 In addition,
Alabama counties began enforcing old, ignored rules that prohibited any individual
over the age of sixty-five from practicing midwifery. 134
After decades of practice, more than 150 Alabama midwives, all of whom
were black, received letters or visits from physicians or nurses informing them that
they could no longer practice midwifery. 135 In one case, a nurse simply "dropped
by" the home of a lay midwife who had been practicing in Mobile County since the
1920's and told her that "she was no longer a midwife."'136 Mrs. Smith remembers
that, "They wrote me at the health department that I couldn't be no more midwife
[sic]. I had to bring my bag and my equipment in, not only me, but all of them that
was delivering." 137
The elimination of lay midwifery in Alabama was effectuated with little
organized resistance. 13 8 Alvin Holmes, the legislator who co-sponsored the bill
that became Act 499, remembers "little controversy" surrounding 499's
enactment. 139 Even though lay midwives had worked under the auspices of local
health departments since 1918, the midwives did not have the political clout to
organize opposition to Act 499. By the 1980s, the majority of Alabama women
delivered their babies in the hospital setting 140 and, today, Alabama women do not
have the legal right to choose any type of midwife (even a nurse-midwife) to attend
deliver the child except under the authorization and supervision of such physician." Id. § 34-19-8.
129 Id. § 34-19-3(b).
130 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 134.
131 Id,
132 Id.
133 Id. at 135.
134 Id.
135 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 135.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 145.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 134.
140 Alabama women who relied on Medicaid benefits, which were established by the federal
government in 1965, could not be attended by lay midwives because Medicaid only paid for deliveries
attended by physicians or nurse-midwives. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(17) (2001) (explaining that the
medical assistance provided under the Medicaid Program includes services furnished by a nurse-
midwife that the nurse-midwife is legally authorized to perform under State law).
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a home delivery. 14 1
E. Upholding Act 499 against Constitutional Challenges: State v. Kimpel
For most lay midwives, the idea of establishing or maintaining an
underground lay midwifery practice following the enactment of Act 499 was not
possible. 14 2 However, Mrs. Smith, and perhaps a few other lay midwives, did
practice for a few years after Act 499 was passed until their permits expired and,
even after that, until their back-up physicians ceased referring patients to them.
Mrs. Smith explains:
But I think Dr. Staggers helped me as long as he could. I have to give him
credit for that. He would let people come through with their girls fixing to
have a baby. Some of them have their babies out thee in the front yard, in
the car. Then I'd have to get on the phone to call him. He'd tell me to fix
them up, carry them on home, and come on by the office.... That was called
underground. I reckon I did that for so long, and then I quit because people
began to talk. 143
Mrs. Smith attended her last delivery in 1981.144
Although Mrs. Smith stopped practicing midwifery in 1981, a few Alabama
midwives did not. Research reveals one published Alabama court opinion, issued
in 1995, in which a woman was charged with violating Act 499. In State v. Kimpel,
the State of Alabama charged Toni Darlene Kimpel in five separate indictments
with practicing nurse midwifery without a license in violation of Act 499.145 In an
unpublished decision, the trial court held that Act 499's provisions were "vague
and ambiguous" and, therefore, unconstitutional. 146  The State of Alabama
appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama,
and it is this court's published decision that is available to the public.147
Unfortunately, the Court of Criminal Appeal's written opinion does not state
Ms. Kimpel's race, age, or the areas of Alabama in which she maintained her
midwifery practice, although the issuance of the indictments by the Mobile County
grand jury suggests that Ms. Kimpel practiced in Mobile County. 148 The court
does explain that Ms. Kimpel never possessed a health department permit to
practice lay midwifery, as did Mrs. Smith. 149 The court further states its belief
regarding why lay midwives no longer have permits: "In fact, no one possesses a
valid health department permit for the practice of lay midwifery. This provision
141 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 143.
142 Id. at 140.
143 Id. at 146.
144 Id. at xvii.
145 State v. Kimpel, 665 So.2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
146 Id. at 991-92.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 994.
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was grandfathered in the 1975 Code. All those who previously held the permits
have terminated their practice, and the health department no longer issues such
permits." 150  Interestingly, the Court's language suggests that lay midwives
voluntarily terminated their practices and then the health department ceased issuing
new permits. 15 1 However, the midwives did not voluntarily cease their practices;
instead, health department officials refused to renew their permits and ultimately
told each remaining lay midwife, by letter or in person, that their practices had to
be discontinued. 152
The indictments issued by the Mobile County grand jury provide further
insight into the nature of Ms. Kimpel's allegedly illegal activities, which appeared
to include typical prenatal care and delivery attendance services: "Toni Darlene
Kimpel... did, by agreement or contract for payment or other payment or
consideration, provide care, management, evaluation, examinations, pre-natal care,
advice and assistance as a nurse midwife during the pregnancy and delivery of a
child.... 153
During the legal proceedings, Ms. Kimpel first challenged her indictment
based on her assertion that she practiced lay midwifery, rather than nurse
midwifery, and that Act 499 was unconstitutionally vague when applied to lay
midwives. 154 Ms. Kimpel argued that because the phrase "nurse midwifery" is
defined in Act 499, and because the phrase "lay midwifery" appears in Act 499 but
is not defined, Act 499 did not prohibit her specific lay midwifery practice. 15 5 The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama disagreed and overturned the trial court's
decision, explaining that Act 499 "clearly prohibits a narrowly defined class of
conduct. We therefore find that this statute is neither vague nor ambiguous."'156
Ms. Kimpel's second challenge to the indictment was predicated on her
assertion that Act 499 constituted an invasion of a pregnant woman's right to
privacy because Act 499 prohibited a pregnant woman from choosing a lay
midwife to attend a home birth. 157 Although the Court recognized the United
States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, which extended the
penumbra of the constitutional right to privacy derived from the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to a woman's right to request a physician to
perform an abortion during her first trimester of pregnancy, the Court disagreed
with Ms. Kimpel's argument. 158 Instead, the Court cited a 1975 California opinion
and a 1991 Colorado opinion for the principle that, under Roe v. Wade, a woman's
constitutional right to privacy does not extend to choosing the manner of childbirth,
150 Id. at 994 n.3
151 See Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 994 n.3.
152 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 135-45.
153 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 993.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 993-94.
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including the presence of a midwife. 159
Ms. Kimpel's third and final challenge to the indictment was predicated on
her assertion that Act 499 violated her right to equal protection under the law. 160
The Court disagreed that lay midwives do not constitute a suspect class and
therefore, the proper standard of review was whether Act 499 was rationally related
to a legitimate government objective:
The Alabama statute regulating the practice of midwifery does not involve
a suspect class. Furthermore, as illustrated above, in discussing Roe,
protection of the safety of a mother and child during labor and delivery is a
legitimate government objective. Therefore, this statute does not violate
the equal protection guarantees of either the federal or our state
constitution. 161
The constitutional freedom to choose a profession is generally evaluated by the
rational basis constitutional standard of review in court cases. To satisfy the
rational basis standard, the state must offer a legitimate. state interest that is
rationally related to the restrictions imposed by the law in question. 162  In
evaluating the rational basis test, courts are extremely deferential to the
legislature's intent and judgment. However, the Kimpel Court's opinion fails to
address the fact that all of the 150 midwives who lost their permits were black, and
that race is a suspect class for purposes of Constitutional analysis. 16 3 The proper
standard of review for statutes that directly target, or have a disparate impact on, a
suspect class is the strict scrutiny test. 164 The strict scrutiny test requires an
analysis of whether the questioned legislation is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. Whether the Court would have upheld Act 499 under the more
159 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 994. (citing People v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1991) and Bowland v.
Mun. Court for Santa Cruz County, 556 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1975)).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See, e.g., Matt Kitzi, supra note 66, Can Missouri Catch Up? Why Missouri Laws Work
Unconstitutional Discrimination Against Lay Midwives and What Can be Done to Stop it, 67 UMKC L.
Rev. 427 at 436 (1998) (explaining the standards of constitutional review).
163 Between 1976 and 1981, over 150 black Alabama midwives lost their permits to practice. SMITH
& HOLMES, supra note 1, at 2, 135.
164 Even in those states in which lay midwives are not predominantly black, one could argue that an
intermediate standard of constitutional review, which is more stringent than the "rational relationship"
test, but less stringent than the "strict scrutiny" test, would be applicable. The intermediate standard of
constitutional review, which asks whether the state legislation serves "important" governmental
objectives and is "substantially related" to the achieving of those objectives, is used to analyze allegedly
discriminatory gender-specific statutes. For example, in United States v. Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court, in reviewing the State of Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the Virginia
Military Institute, declared that the state must produce an "exceedingly persuasive justification" in order
to allow a gender-discriminating law to stand. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). In Kimpel, one could have
made the argument that when a professional field like midwifery has been traditionally, and is currently,
composed of one sex, that profession has adopted that gender's definition and identification and,
therefore, the applicable level of constitutional scrutiny should be the intermediate level of scrutiny.
Whether Kimpel's attorneys raised this issue is unclear, although unlikely, due to the fact that in the
opinion, the court clearly utilizes the rational basis standard of review. The success of a gender-based
argument likely would have been limited due to the fact that most midwifery statutes do not limit the
profession to women.
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stringent scrutiny analysis is unclear. However, the Court's failure to identify Act
499's true effect on black lay midwives is telling.
After disagreeing with all three of Ms. Kimpel's assertions, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama ultimately reversed the trial court's decision
dismissing the indictments and ordered the trial court to restore the indictments to
the trial docket for appropriate disposition.165
IV. MASSACHUSETTS: EARLY BAN OF MIDWIFERY
A. Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts Medicine
Massachusetts was the "center" of opposition to midwifery at the turn of the
century. 166 In 1915, a Pennsylvania physician stated, "I know of no other section
of the country which has been more successful in prohibition [of midwives] than
Massachusetts." 16 7 The State's opposition to midwives may be explained, in part,
by the classification of midwives with other types of irregular 168 practitioners
including Thomsonians and homeopaths. 169 "Regular physicians sought to edge
out competitors, including women practitioners and other rivals they lumped
together as 'irregulars' and discredited as 'quacks."' 1 70
Perhaps as a result of these efforts, Massachusetts passed its Medical Practice
Act in 1894, which established guidelines for the examination and licensing of
physicians.171 Importantly, the 1894 Medical Practice Act considered obstetrics a
medical practice that required licensing. 172 Moreover, the Medical Practice Act
165 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 994.
166 Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 376.
167 Id.
168 Research for case law involving lawsuits against midwives revealed many cases that did not
involve lawsuits against midwives, but that were identified simply because the word "midwife" was in
the same sentence as the phrase "irregular practitioner." See, e.g., Monohan v. Divinny, 225 N.Y.S.
601, 604 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (noting that the term "malpractice" has been applied not only to duly licensed
physicians and surgeons, "but to irregular practitioners as well, and also to nurses, midwives, and
apothecaries").
169 In the early nineteenth-century, many Americans turned away from conventional, but harsh,
medical treatments including bleeding and purging. Instead, they embraced milder, less debilitating
therapeutic regimens. Samuel Thomson, a leading spokesman of this movement, explained that he
learned of botanic medicine from a female herbalist who cured his wife after an allopathic physician had
failed to do so. Thomson believed that the common cold brought on an illness that restored the body's
natural heat and, thus, cured the cold. After a decade of local practice, Thomson outlined his principles
in his 1822 book, New Guide to Health; or Botanic Family Physician. See SAMUEL THOMSON, NEW
GUIDE TO HEALTH; OR BOTANIC FAMILY PHYSICIAN (1835), portions reprinted in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN AND PUBLIC HEALTH 71-73 (John Harley Warner & Janet A. Tighe eds.,
2001). Thomsonian medicine, named after Samuel Thomson, was originally egalitarian and anti-elitist,
in keeping with the spirit of the Jacksonian era. See JOHN S. HALLER, MEDICAL PROTESTANTS: THE
ECLECTICS IN AMERICAN MEDICINE, 1825-1939 (1994), available at Dittrick Medical History Center,
http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/dittrick/artifactspages/a-3certificate.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2003).
170 JOHN HARLEY WARNER AND JANET A. TIGHE, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 56 (2001).
171 Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves of the State of
Massachusetts ch. 458, § 11 (1894).
172 Id.
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equated midwifery with obstetrics. Thus, a lay midwife who attended home
deliveries or used any instruments or carried any drugs and was not also licensed as
a physician would violate the Medical Practice Act. 17 3
Three years after Massachusetts passed its Medical Practice Act, the state
passed its 1897 Birth Registration Act, which required physicians and midwives to
report all of the births they had attended to the local city clerk. 174 The combination
of the 1894 Medical Practice Act and the 1897 Birth Registration Act created a
Catch 22 for midwives. Stated another way, midwives who failed to register births
would be considered to have violated the 1897 Birth Registration Act, and
midwives who appropriately registered births under the 1897 Birth Registration Act
would be considered to have engaged in the unlicensed practice of obstetrics and,
thus, the unlicensed practice of medicine in violation of the 1894 Medical Practice
Act. 175 Although the 1894 and 1897 legislation curbed the practices of some lay
midwives, other midwives, including several whose practices were located in
Lawrence, Massachusetts, continued to attend home deliveries until at least
1914.176
B. The Prosecution of Massachusetts Midwife Hanna Porn
The numerous legal battles by Massachusetts midwife Hanna Porn provide
some insight into the competition midwives faced in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Hanna Porn was born in Finland in 1860 and arrived in
Gardner, Massachusetts in 1895.177 In 1896, Porn traveled to Chicago where she
attended the Chicago Midwife Institute, "from which she received a diploma,
which stated that she had received theoretical and practical instruction in the art of
midwifery for a period of six months, and was declared a graduated midwife." 17 8
After graduating, Porn returned to Gardner, Massachusetts, to establish her
midwifery practice. Porn recorded her first delivery attendance in February
1897.179 In the next eleven years, Porn recorded over six hundred births, which is
more than the number of births recorded by all at the time except for one physician
in Gardner. 180 Most of Porn's clients were other immigrant women, mainly from
the Finnish, Russian, and Swedish communities, all of whom were of the working
class. 181 An important factor in Porn's clients' decisions to use Porn was likely
cost. Porn only charged two to five dollars for her entire package of midwifery
services, which included delivery attendance and after-care visits every day to the
173 Id.
174 Eugene R. Declercq, The Trials of Hanna Porn: The Campaign to Abolish Midwifery in
Massachusetts, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1022, 1026 (June 1994).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Declercq, supra note 174, at 1023.
178 See Commonwealth v. Porn, 82 N.E. 31 (Mass. 1907).
179 Declercq, supra note 174, at 1023.
180 Id.
181 Id. See also Corcoran, supra note 66, at 649 (describing the Commonwealth v. Porn decision).
[Vol. 11:61
HeinOnline -- 11 Cardozo Women's L.J. 82 2004-2005
PHYSICIAN-CONTROLLED CHILDBIRTH
new mother and baby for a minimum of one week as well as cooking and cleaning
services during that week. 182 Porn's fee was approximately one-third of the fees
charged by local Gardner physicians for delivery attendance alone. Statistics
demonstrated that the babies delivered in Porn's attendance were twice as likely to
survive as babies delivered by local Gardner physicians. 183
Despite Porn's success, the State of Massachusetts formally charged Porn on
July 27, 1905, with the criminal act of illegally practicing medicine.1 84 The
charges were not initiated by an injured or unhappy client of Porn's; instead the
charges-were brought by Edwin B. Harvey, M.D., the executive secretary of the
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine (the "Board"). 185 The Board
complained that Porn "held herself out as a midwife and practiced midwifery, but
did not claim to be a general practitioner of medicine, nor was she lawfully
authorized to practise [sic] medicine," all of which violated the 1894 Medical
Practice Act. 186 As discussed above, the Massachusetts Medical Practice Act did
not distinguish between the scope of practice of a midwife and a physician,
although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that it would have
been within the power of the Massachusetts Legislature to "separate by a line of
statutory demarcation the work of the midwife from that of the practitioner in
medicine." 187
During Porn's 1907 trial, physicians testified on behalf of the Board that
midwifery was synonymous with obstetrics and, therefore, that unlicensed and
untrained midwives should be prevented from attending deliveries. 18 8 The Board
emphasized the following additional facts:
[Porn] delivered many women in childbirth for compensation, and carried
with her to her patients the usual obstetrical instruments, which she used
rarely on occasions of emergency, but never if a physician could be called
in time. She used six printed prescriptions or formulas in treating her
patients, which contained directions for their application, and the purposes
for which they were used, as follows: 'For vaginal douche,' 'For
postpartum hemorrhage,' 'To prevent purulent ophthalmia in the new-
born,' 'For afterpains,' 'For uterine inertia,' and 'For painful hemorrhoids
or piles." She used no other prescriptions or formulas. 18
9
Interestingly, the 1907 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked to
"medical and popular lexicographers" for a definition of "midwife," and found that
"midwife" meant "female obstetrician" and that "midwifery" was equivalent to the
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Commonwealth v. Porn, 81 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1907) (evidentiary decision); Commonwealth v.
Porn, 82 N.E. 31 (Mass. 1907) (substantive decision).
185 Declercq, supra note 174, at 1024.
186 Porn, 82 N.E. at 31.
187 Id. at 32.
188 Declercq, supra note 174, at 1024-25.
189 Porn, 82 N.E. at 31.
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"practice of obstetrics." The Court concluded that, "This goes far toward showing
that obstetrics is a branch of the practice of medicine": 190
It requires no discussion to demonstrate that, when, in addition to ordinary
assistance in the normal cases of childbirth, there is the occasional use of
obstetrical instruments, and a habit of prescribing for the conditions
described in the printed formulas which the defendant carried, such a
course of conduct constitutes a practice of medicine in one of its branches.
Although childbirth is not a disease, but a normal function of women, yet
the practice of medicine does not appertain exclusively to disease, and
obstetrics as matter of common knowledge has long been treated as a
highly important branch of the science of medicine. 19 1
In summary, the physicians who controlled the Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Medicine contended that midwifery was the same as obstetrics and
convinced the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court of this as well.
As a final effort, Porn argued that the 1894 Medical Practice Act's midwifery
ban was unconstitutional as "class legislation" because, if the Act was construed to
prohibit the practice of midwifery, the practices of other classes of practitioners
were not also prohibited by the then-current provisions of the Act. 192 Stated
another way, Porn argued disparate treatment of midwives as a profession. Porn
based her argument on a provision in the 1894 Medical Practice Act that excluded
from the prohibition on unlicensed medical practice "clairvoyants or persons
practicing hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage, Christian science
cosmopathic method of healing," 19 3 but not midwives. Without further discussing
Porn's class legislation claim, the Court simply stated, "[The Act's] validity cannot
be questioned on this ground. The maintenance of a high standard of professional
qualifications for physicians is of vital concern to the public health, and reasonable
regulations to this end do not contravene any provision of the State or Federal
Constitution." 194 Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that
Porn was "of good character and reputation," it ultimately concluded that her
actions constituted criminal violations of the Medical Practice Act. 19 5Although
Hanna Porn was convicted in the 1907 case as well as several other cases, Porn
continued to serve her working class immigrant client base. 196 Throughout 1907,
Porn's midwifery practice grew steadily and, in December of 1907, she was
arrested again. Porn went to trial in 1908 and she was ultimately sentenced to a
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Porn, 81 N.E. 305 (citing MASS. R.L. c.76, § 8, now MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 6 (2004)).
193 Michael H. Cohen, State Law Regulation of the Practice of Medicine: Implications for the
Practice of Complementary and Alternative Medicine, (Nancy Fass, ed., 2000), available at http://www.
michaelhcohen.com/article7.html (Dec. 8, 2003).
194 Porn, 82 N.E. at 32.
195 Id.
196 Declercq, supra note 174, at 1027.
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$100 fine and three months jail time. 197
Porn endured ten trials in all, but remained "unwavering in her commitment
to safer, more comprehensive, and affordable maternity care in her community."198
Of the ten cases filed against Porn, not one was brought by a client. Instead, all of
the cases were initiated by medical professionals who were members of the
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine who, perhaps, viewed Porn's
practice as infringing on their client base. Porn's unwillingness to terminate her
practice may have increased opposition by the Gardner medical community and the
Massachusetts medical establishment. Interestingly, Porn seems to have had the
last word. "Her 1913 obituary noted that she was employed as a 'private nurse' at
an address where, according to local vital records, a baby boy was born on the day
she died." 199
Statistics suggest one reason why physicians in Massachusetts felt the need to
prosecute Hanna Porn despite her good reputation and positive health outcomes.
Midwives attended 19.9 percent of all births in Massachusetts in 1900. However,
this percentage more than doubled by 1908, when midwives attended 41.3 percent
of all births.200 During this period, the number of physician-attended deliveries
dropped.20 1 In addition, the number of different midwives attending deliveries
increased.202 In 1896, only one midwife (Louise Beck) delivered the 327 reported
midwife-attended deliveries. 20 3 By 1913, more than a dozen midwives attended
the registered births, which numbered almost 100 births per month, with the busiest
midwife (Minnie Riehm) accounting for only 18 percent of all midwife-attended
deliveries.20 4 Perhaps the Massachusetts physicians felt uncomfortable with such a
high number of practicing midwives. 20 5 If only one or two midwives practiced,
they could be shut down at any time. However, with so many midwives running
such active practices, the exclusiveness of the Massachusetts medical profession
over childbirth may have been threatened.
C. The Immigrant Midwives of Lawrence, Massachusetts
The 1894 and 1897 Massachusetts legislation curbed the practices of some
lay midwives. However, other midwives, including several practicing in Lawrence,
Massachusetts, continued to attend home deliveries. 20 6  The 1894 and 1897
197 See Discrimination against Midwives, at http://www.students.haverford.eduiwmbweb
/writings/rlmidwives.html#notes (last visited Dec. 7, 2003); Declercq, supra note 174, at 1027.
198 Corcoran, supra note 66, at 649.
199 Id.
200 Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 382-83.





206 Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 377-78 ("Midwifery practice continued and, as the example
of Lawrence will illustrate, flourished openly in some areas for almost a decade after the Porn
decision.").
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legislation did not have an immediate impact on the practice of lay midwifery in
Lawrence.
For example, in 1907, the year the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
issued its published opinion in Commonwealth v. Porn, three midwives in
Lawrence-Virginia Pedrazzini, Angelina DeMarco, and Laura Carpenito-attended
thirty-nine registered births.207 In 1913, six years following the Porn case, these
three women attended 442 births and registered all of them with the Lawrence City
Clerk.20 8  Eugene Declercq explains the confluence of several factors that
contributed to the popularity of midwives in Lawrence, Massachusetts during that
time period: (1) the immigrant status of the population; (2) the lack of a local
hospital providing obstetrical services; (3) the quality of care provided at a limited
cost by the midwives; (4) the midwives' use of advertising; and (5) the midwives'
ability to circumvent the laws.20 9
The limited fees the Lawrence midwives charged is an important factor. The
standard cost for midwifery services in Lawrence was five dollars, which included
"attendance at confinement, simple nursing care, help in the household duties and
general nursing and oversight of the home until such time as she is able to resume
her work."'2 10 Lawrence midwives provided daily checkups for a period of
approximately eight to ten days after the delivery of the baby, while physicians
only provided one or two visits after the delivery.2 11 Like Maine midwife Martha
Ballard who accepted food, cloth, ribbons, and dressmaking services in exchange
for her midwifery services,2 12 many Lawrence midwives also accepted payment of
food or services as an "in kind" payment. 2 13 Lawrence physicians, on the other
hand, wanted "their ten dollar fee in cash." 214
Because neither the 1894 nor the 1897 legislation appeared to have any
immediate effect on the Lawrence midwives, the Massachusetts physicians
attempted to influence public opinion against them by educating the public to select
physicians for their deliveries instead of midwives. 2 15 In addition to public
education, the Massachusetts Legislature also attempted to directly regulate
physicians' involvement with midwives. First, the legislature passed a 1912
amendment to the 1897 Birth Registration Act, which required physicians to
indicate on birth retums whether they had personally attended a birth. 2 16 The 1912
legislation added an additional line to the birth registration form that read, "I did
207 Id. at 376.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 385-87.
210 Id. at 387.
211 Id.
212 ULRICH, supra note 5, at 86-90.
213 Id.
214 Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 387.
215 Id. at 378.
216 Id. at 377.
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(doctor's name) personally attend this birth. '2 17  The implication of this
amendment is that physicians who collaborated with midwives would be identified
through birth registration records. Second, the Legislature passed a 1917
amendment to the 1894 Medical Practice Act that prohibited a physician from
"act[ing] as a principal or assistant in carrying on the practice of medicine by an
unregistered person," and would impose a one-year license revocation for those
who assisted unlicensed individuals with the practice of medicine.2 18
Although neither piece of legislation single handedly eliminated midwifery in
Lawrence, a combination of the "legal restrictions, physicians' opposition, the
greater influx of foreign born doctors, the rise in hospital births, the passage of
restrictions on immigration in the 1920's, and the assimilation of immigrants
resulted in the diminution of midwifery practice." 2 19
D. 1975 Nurse-Midwifery Legislation
After Massachusetts passed its 1894 Medical Practice Act, which made the
practice of lay midwifery illegal, more than three-quarters of a century passed
before the state permitted nurse-midwives to practice under the supervision of a
licensed physician in a health care facility. In 1975, the Massachusetts Legislature
added the following statutory provision, entitled "An Act Providing for the Practice
of Nurse-Midwifery," to its General Laws: "A nurse-midwife [licensed under
Massachusetts law]... may engage in the practice of nurse-midwifery; provided,
however, that the nurse-midwife functions as a member of a health care team which
includes a qualified physician licensed to practice medicine in the commonwealth
which physician has admitting privileges in a [licensed hospital] .... ' 220
Regulations adopted in 1980 to implement the 1975 legislation further
prohibited any person from practicing as a nurse-midwife without first obtaining
the Board's authorization to do so.22 1 The combination of the legislation and the
implementing regulations permitted nurses to practice as nurse-midwives with the
Board's specific authorization. Even then, however, authorized nurse-midwives
could only practice in a health care facility and only under the supervision of a
licensed physician. Thus, the legislation expressly prohibited a nurse-midwife
from attending a home delivery. In addition, the legislation did not expressly
regulate lay midwives, which became the subject of an opinion written by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1985 in Leigh v. Board of Registration
in Nursing.2 2 2
217 Id. at 388.
218 Id. at 379.
219 Id. at 389.
220 See 1975 Mass. Acts. ch. 846, § 2, adding MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 80C. See also id. § 80B,
which provides, "Nursing practice involves clinical decision making leading to the development and
implementation of a strategy of care to accomplish defined goals . . . including certified nurse
midwives."
221 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 244, § 4.11.
222 Leigh v. Board of Registration of Nursing, 481 N.E.2d at 1347 (Mass. 1985).
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E. Constitutional Challenges to Massachusetts' Nurse-Midwifery Legislation
In Leigh v. Board of Registration of Nursing,22 3 Janet Leigh, a Massachusetts
licensed registered nurse whose license had been continuously in effect since May
1, 1970, attended to a woman's delivery (in the woman's home) on September 23,
1982.224 Importantly, Leigh had never applied to the Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Nursing (the Board) for authorization to practice as a nurse-
midwife, and therefore, she was not a certified nurse-midwife. 225 Complications
arose during the labor, and Leigh called an ambulance and accompanied the woman
to the hospital. At the hospital, Leigh gave the admitting physician the patient's
history, which is presumably how the Board became aware of Leigh's home birth
practice. The receiving hospital or emergency room physician likely reported
Leigh to the Board.
After reviewing the case, the Board concluded that Leigh was a registered
nurse engaged in the unauthorized practice of midwifery in violation of both the
1975 Massachusetts legislation and its 1980 implementing regulations and
suspended her license to practice nursing for one year.226 In her defense, Leigh
first argued that she was only engaged in the practice of lay midwifery, which was
outside the practice of nursing and distinct from nurse-midwifery. 227 Second,
Leigh argued that she was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine.228
The Board disagreed, responding that Leigh failed to rebut the argument that she
violated the regulations controlling the conduct of nurses acting as midwives. The
Board argued and the Court agreed that the 1975 legislation did not distinguish
between lay midwifery and nurse-midwifery, even though the 1975 legislation did
not expressly speak to lay midwifery.
The Court further explained that the result would have been different had
Leigh not been a nurse and, instead, was just any other unlicensed person:
There is no statutory prohibition against the practice of lay midwifery by
lay persons. The Legislature has not regulated midwifery by persons other
than nurses. Nor do we interpret our case law to prohibit the practice of
midwifery as the unauthorized practice of medicine. In Commonwealth v.
Porn... the court upheld the conviction of a midwife for the unauthorized
practice of medicine. However, the basis of her conviction was not her
practice of midwifery per se but the fact that she used 'the usual obstetrical
instruments'.... This court stated: '[W]hen, in addition to ordinary
childbirth assistance in the normal cases of childbirth, there is the
occasional use of obstetrical instruments.., such a course of conduct
constitutes a practice of medicine in one of its branches.'.... Thus, 'ordinary
223 Id.
224 Id. at 1349.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1350.
227 Leigh, 481 N.E.2d at 1351.
228 Id.
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assistance in the normal cases of childbirth,' which we interpret to mean
the practice of midwifery, would not be considered the practice of
medicine. 229
Leigh also attacked the constitutionality of the 1975 legislation, arguing that
the legislation: (1) violated the fundamental right of privacy of a mother to choose
where and with whom she will give birth; (2) offended due process of law because
the legislation deprives Leigh of her right to practice her profession and lacks a
rational basis; and (3) violated the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.230
Summarily stating that the 1975 legislation did not prohibit lay individuals
(i.e., non-nurses) from attending home deliveries, the Court did not consider
Leigh's constitutional privacy argument any further. With respect to Leigh's due
process argument, the Court simply stated that the 1975 legislation bears a
"reasonable and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some
other phase of the general welfare." 23 1 Finally, with respect to Leigh's equal
protection argument, the Court simply deferred to the Massachusetts Legislature,
stating that "[t]he Legislature apparently concluded that nurses needed training
beyond their nursing training in order to practice midwifery." 2 32  The 1985
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately remanded the case to the
Board for further consideration. 233
After the Board reconsidered the decision at the direction of the Supreme
Judicial Court, the Board again suspended Leigh for practicing midwifery in
violation of the 1975 legislation and the 1980 implementing regulations. 234 Leigh
appealed the Board's decision, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
analyzed Leigh's appeal in a second 1987 opinion.2 35 In this appeal, Leigh re-
argued her equal protection claim more specifically, emphasizing that the law
prohibits nurses and nurse-midwives from attending home births but does not
similarly restrict lay midwives.236 The Court responded again with deference to
the Legislature:
The Legislature has expressed its preference that births attended by
nonphysicians take place in licensed facilities with the assistance of
certified nurse midwives... The fact that the Legislature has not enacted
legislation regulating lay midwives does not render the statute regulating
nurse midwives unconstitutional. The equal protection clause does not
require the government to choose between attacking every aspect of a
229 Id. at 1353.
230 Id. at 1354.
231 Id. (quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307
Mass. 408, 418 (Mass. 1940)).
232 Id. at 1355.
233 Leigh, 481 N.E.2d at 1356.
234 See Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91 (Mass. 1987) [hereinafter "Leigh
I1].
235 Id.
236 Id. at 92.
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problem or not attacking it at all... The State has a legitimate purpose in
assuring a minimal level of training and competence in nurses licensed by
the board so that consumers may rely on the board certification in making
informed decisions about health care.237
On appeal, Leigh renewed her privacy claim and further argued that the 1975
legislation illegally restrained trained midwives in violation of federal and
Massachusetts antitrust law.2 38 The Court summarily decided that actions of the
Massachusetts Legislature and of the Board were sovereign actions of the State,
which are exempt from antitrust liability. 239 The 1985 Court ultimately disagreed
with all of Leigh's claims and ordered the trial court to affirm the original decision
of the Board to suspend Leigh's license to practice as a registered nurse.240
V. CALIFORNIA: LICENSED LAY MIDWIVES PERMITTED TO ATTEND HOME
DELIVERIES UNDER PHYSICIAN "SUPERVISION"
A. The History of the Regulation of Midwives in California: 1915-1975
California's regulation of midwifery has an extremely checkered history. In
1915, the California Legislature enacted a law that required midwives to complete
birth certificates and register midwife-attended births that were not also attended by
a physician.24 1 The law specifically stated:
In each case where a physician, or midwife, or person acting as midwife,
was in attendance upon birth, it shall be the duty of such physician to file in
accordance herewith the certificate herein contemplated. In case no
physician was in attendance, it shall be the duty of the midwife or person
acting as midwife to file such certificate. 242
This requirement remained in effect until 1957, when the Legislature deleted
the word "midwife" from the statute, which resulted in the parents being the only
individuals permitted to register births that occurred unattended by a physician. 243
Midwifery proponents criticized the 1957 revision because parental registration of
planned midwife-attended home-births resulted in the documentation and reporting
of an "unassisted birth," which skewed the statistics regarding the safety of
planned, midwife-attended births.244
In 2000, the California Legislature amended the California Health and Safety
237 Id. at 93.
238 Id. at 94-95.
239 Leigh II, 506 N.E.2d at 95.
240 Leigh, 481 N.E.2d at 1356.
241 1915 Cal. Stat. Ch. 378, § 13, at 581 (providing for the registration of all births and deaths and
requiring the physician or midwife attending births to file the birth certificate).
242 Id.
243 See 1957 Cal. Stat. Ch. 363, § 10102, at 1181, 1995 Cal. Stat. Ch. 415, § 4, at 79 (requiring
parents to complete the birth certificate in the event that a physician does not attend a birth at home).
244 Happe, supra note 66, at 723-4.
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Code to permit a licensed midwife, in the absence of a physician, to prepare and
register birth celtificates for live midwife-attended births that occurred outside of
hospitals or alternative birthing centers.24 5 Specifically, the Legislature amended
Section 102415 of the California Health & Safety Code to provide:
For live births that occur outside of a hospital or outside of a state-licensed
alternative birth center... the physician in attendance at the birth or, in the
absence of a physician, the professionally licensed midwife in attendance at
the birth or, in the absence of a physician or midwife, either one of the
parents shall be responsible for entering the information on the certificate,
securing the required signatures, and for registering the certificates with the
local registrar. 246
The California Legislature also regulated the practice and certification of
midwives. 247 In 1917 and 1937, the California Legislature enacted and amended a
statutory scheme, set forth in the California Business and Professions Code and
entitled "Healing Arts" [hereinafter California "Medical Practice Act" or the
"Act"], which authorized the issuance of certificates to individuals allowing the
practice of medicine or surgery, podiatry, and midwifery.24 8 Midwifery was then,
and still is, defined in California as "the furthering or undertaking by any person to
assist a woman in normal childbirth. '249 One of the provisions within the Act
made the uncertified practice of midwifery a misdemeanor.2 50
In 1949, the California Legislature amended its Medical Practice Act to
exclude midwifery from the group of practices for which new certificates could be
issued. 25 1 This change followed new developments in obstetric medicine and
public education efforts designed to encourage women to deliver in what was
believed to be the safer and less painful hospital environment.2 52 However, the
Legislature maintained the provisions defining midwifery, the practices authorized
under a midwifery certificate, and the provisions designating the conditions under
which a midwife's certificate could be revoked.253 The inference to be drawn from
the retention of these provisions is that the Legislature intended to prohibit the
practice of midwifery without a certificate, while permitting the practice of
midwifery under an unrevoked certificate issued before 1949.254
In 1975, the California legislature passed new provisions to be placed in the
245 Id. at 723.
246 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102415 (Deering 2004).
247 See 1917 Cal. Star., Ch. 81, § 8, pp. 96-7; 1937 Cal. Stat., Ch. 399, § 2135, p. 1258.
248 See id.
249 Former CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 2140 (Deering 1937).
250 Id. at § 2141.
251 1949 Cal. Stat., Ch. 898, p. 193.
252 LEAVITT, supra note 3, at 178 (noting that throughout the 1920's and 1930's, "popular journals
as well as medical journals urged women to go to the hospital to receive the best possible obstetrical
care and to insure the safety of both mother and child.").
253 1949 Cal. Stat. ch. 898, p. 193.
254 Bowland v. Municipal Court, 556 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Cal. 1976).
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Medical Practice Act that provided for the certification of midwives.2 55 From 1975
to 1993, the California Legislature specifically regulated the practice of nurse
midwives by requiring certification, but did not specifically regulate lay
midwives. 256
B. Bowland and Northrup: The Practice of Lay Midwifery in California
Constitutes the Unlicensed Practice of Medicine
Although the California Legislature's silence with respect to lay midwives
arguably could have been interpreted as establishing an "a-legal" (not legal but not
illegal) status for lay midwives, California courts reviewed charges filed against lay
midwives for practicing medicine without a license in violation of the California
Medical Practice Act in 1976 and, again, in 1987.257 In both cases, the California
courts determined that the lay midwives were practicing medicine without a license
contrary to the provisions of the California Medical Practice Act because they were
holding themselves out as diagnosing and treating the physical condition of
pregnancy. 258
In Bowland v. Municipal Court, a 1976 decision by the Supreme Court of
California, the State of California had charged three women who held themselves
out as midwives but who were not nurses (and who, therefore, had not obtained
certificates from the State permitting them to attend deliveries as certified nurse-
midwives) with the unlicensed practice of medicine under the State's Medical
Practice Act.259 All three women had worked at the Santa Cruz Birth Center,
which was created in 1971 in part because no physician in Santa Cruz County
would provide prenatal care to a woman who planned a home delivery. 260 In
Bowland, the State specifically alleged that from October 25, 1973, through March
6, 1974, each woman "did willfully and unlawfully hold herself out as practicing a
system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted to Wit: such practices as undertaking
to assist and treat a woman in childbirth..... 261 In so doing, the State relied on
then-current § 2140 of the Medical Practice Act, which provided that a "certificate
of midwifery authorized the holder to attend cases of normal childbirth," and §
2141 of the same Act, which provided:
Any person, who practices or attempts to practice, or who advertises or
holds himself out as practicing, any system or mode of treating the sick or
afflicted in this state, or who diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes
255 Id. at 1086.
256 See Happe, supra note 66, at 721 (citing California Senate Rules Committee, Senate Analysis of
SB 1479, at 4 (Apr. 6, 2000)).
257 See Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1081; Northrup v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal Ct. App.
1987).
258 See Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1081; Northrup, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
259 Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1081.
260 LAY, supra note 67, at 68-72.
261 Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1082-83.
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for any ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder,
injury, or other mental or physical condition of any person, without having
at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate as provided in this
chapter, or without being authorized to perform such act pursuant to a
certificate obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.26 2
The three charged women cited numerous court decisions characterizing childbirth
as a normal biological function of women, rather than a "disease or sickness" in
support of their argument that their attendance in home deliveries did not constitute
the practice of medicine. 263 However, the Supreme Court of California relied on
the phrase "physical condition" and argued that such phrase does not necessarily
imply the existence of an abnormality or disease and, therefore, readily
encompasses pregnancy and childbirth.2 64 The Supreme Court of California held
that although pregnancy is not a "sickness or affliction," pregnancy is a "physical
condition." The Court then concluded that the Code prohibits unlicensed persons,
including the three lay midwives from Santa Cruz, from diagnosing, treating,
operating upon, or prescribing for a women undergoing normal pregnancy or
childbirth and that such activities only may be undertaken by certified nurse-
midwives. 265
The Supreme Court of California also addressed the three lay midwives'
arguments that the California Medical Practice Act provisions were
unconstitutionally overbroad and violated a pregnant woman's right of privacy to
choose a lay midwife to attend a home delivery. The Court ruled that although the
phrase "other mental or physical condition," read in the context of the entire
paragraph, was "admittedly broad," it was not "overbroad," especially in light of
the State's "strong and demonstrable interest in protecting its citizens from persons
who claim some expertise in the healing arts but whose qualifications have not
been established by the receipt of a certificate." 266 With respect to the privacy
claim, the Court explained, rather defensively, that:
For the same policy reasons for which the Legislature may prohibit the
abortion of unborn children who have reached the point of viability, it may
require that those who assist in childbirth have valid licenses. Its interest in
regulating the qualifications of those who hold themselves out as childbirth
attenders is an equally strong one, for many women must 'necessarily rely
on those with qualifications which they cannot personally verify. Not is
the state's interest in requiring a license diminished by the fact that
childbirth with assistance, even the assistance of an unlicensed person, may
be safer than self-delivery. The state need not prohibit the most unlikely of
262 CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2141 (Deering 1976) (emphasis added).
263 Id. at 1084.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 1088.
2004]
HeinOnline -- 11 Cardozo Women's L.J. 93 2004-2005
CARDOZO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
circumstances-childbirth without assistance-in order to justify regulating
the much more common event-assistance of the mother at childbirth. In
the area of public welfare, the Legislature need not attack every social
problem at once. Plaintiffs' further arguments as to the safety of home
deliveries are more properly addressed to the Legislature than the courts,
particularly since the Legislature, by its recent enactments pertaining to
midwifery... [in 1975], has shown continuing interest in the area.267
Eleven years later after the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
Bowland, a California Court of Appeals reviewed a somewhat similar set of facts in
Northrup v. Superior Court.268 In Northrup, Geneva Northrup and Julia Young,
who were members of The Church of the First Born, applied for a writ of
prohibition requesting that charges brought against them for practicing midwifery
without proper certification be set aside. Under the tenets of The Church of the
First Born, use of medical professionals is not permitted.269 Pregnant members of
the Church do not consult obstetricians. Instead, they use attendants like Northrup
and Young, who are also Church members, to assist them at childbirth. 270
Three births formed the basis of the charges in the instant decision. On
December 29, 1984, Northrup and Young attended the labor of Pat Bell, Northrup's
daughter. Pat's daughter was stillborn. On January 5, 1985, petitioner Northrup
attended the delivery of Frieda Wilkinson, whose daughter was born healthy.
Finally, on April 26, 1985, Northrup attended the delivery of her daughter-in-law,
whose baby boy was stillborn. 27 1
The Court of Appeals ultimately held that although the activities of the
attendants constituted midwifery and the treatment of a "physical condition" under
the California Medical Practice Act, per Bowland, the attendants were exempt from
the midwifery certification pursuant to a religious practice exemption272 in light of
the fact that they were attending the deliveries of other members of their Church. 273
C. The California Licensed Midwifery Practice Act of 1993
In 1982, the Department of Consumer Affairs issued a report stating that both
lay and nurse midwives provided perinatal services proven to lower perinatal
morbidity and mortality rates. 274 The California Legislature was persuaded by that
report and, in 1993, enacted the California Licensed Midwifery Practice Act of
267 Id. at 1089.
268 Northrup, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
269 Id. at 256.
270 Id. at 257.
271 Id.
272 The California Medical Practice Act's religious practice exemption provided, in relevant part:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to . . . regulate, prohibit, or apply to any kind of
treatment by prayer, nor interfere in any way with the practice of religion." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
2063 (Deering 2004).
273 Northrup, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
274 See also 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 1280, § 1(h), (referring to the 1982 report and noting the report's
influence on the California Legislature).
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1993 (CLMPA)275 to help facilitate pregnant women's access to lay midwife-
attended home births. Importantly the CLMPA governed both lay and nurse
midwives, unlike the California Legislature's 1917, 1937, 1949, and 1975
enactments. Thus, one effect of the legislation was to professionalize lay
midwifery in the State of California.2 76
The CLMPA establishes the scope of practice of a licensed midwife and
permits midwives to attend home deliveries if such midwives work under the
supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon who has current practice or
training in obstetrics:
(a) The license to practice midwifery authorizes the holder, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon, to attend cases of normal
childbirth and to provide prenatal, intrapartum, and postpartum care,
including family-planning care, for the mother, and immediate care for the
newborn.
(b) As used in this article, the practice of midwifery constitutes the
furthering or undertaking by any licensed midwife, under the supervision
of a licensed physician and surgeon who has current practice or training in
obstetrics, to assist a woman in childbirth so long as progress meets criteria
accepted as normal. All complications shall be referred to a physician and
surgeon immediately. The practice of midwifery does not include the
assisting of childbirth by any artificial, forcible, or mechanical means, nor
the performance of any version.27 7
The CLMPA further explained that the term "supervision" should not be construed
to require the physical presence of the supervising physician and surgeon.
278
Following the passage of the CLMPA, many medical malpractice carriers
discontinued coverage of, or dramatically increased premiums for, those physicians
who supervised midwives under the CLMPA.2 79 Accordingly, few midwives have
established the required relationship with a physician to enable them to attend
home deliveries in strict compliance with the CLMPA.2 80 Through 2001, 111
midwives became licensed in California under the CLMPA. However, as of 2001,
only one midwife was able to obtain a supervising physician. That midwife also
happened to be licensed under California law as a physician's assistant, perhaps
explaining her physician's trust.28 1 Because of physicians' reluctance to serve as
supervising physicians, the CLMPA's supervision requirement has been referred to
as an "unintended legal barrier which has rendered the legislation unworkable and
275 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2505-08, 2511-2515.5, 2517-2521 (Deering 2004).
276 Until the CLMPA, only physician assistants and registered nurses could, within the scope of their
respective license practice acts, obtain additional licensure as midwives.
277 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2507(a), (b) (Deering 2004).
278 Id. § 2507(c).
279 See Happe, supra note 66, at 713 & n.4.
280 Id. at 714 & n.5.
281 Id. at 722 & n.79.
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unusable for California women and families." 282
D. Administrative Scrutiny and Criminal Prosecution of Midwives
Some midwives who were unable to secure a supervising physician as
required under the CLMPA continued to attend home deliveries, but not without
scrutiny from the Medical Board of California. Indeed, from August 16 to 20,
1999, an Administrative Law Judge in Sacramento heard In re Osborn, an
administrative action taken by the California Medical Board to determine whether a
woman's license to practice midwifery should be revoked. 283 The respondent,
Alison Osborn, was a lay midwife who was properly. licensed under the CLMPA.
Unfortunately, Osborn lived and worked in an area in which the obstetricians were
very hostile to licensed midwives, and Osborn had been unable to find a physician
who would agree to formally supervise her. Nevertheless, Osborn was able to find
a physician who agreed to provide informal collaborative consultations as well as
assistance with respect to emergent issues.
When one of her patients delivered a stillborn during a breech birth, Osbom's
situation came to the attention of the Medical Board of California. However, the
Medical Board decided not to revoke Osborn's license, recognizing that, "No
California physician [will] supervise licensed midwives who undertake home births
for reasons related primarily to liability exposure" and that "a small minority of
California physicians object to licensed midwives and will not undertake their
supervision on philosophical grounds."2 84 The Medical Board further found that
Osborn had demonstrated her experience, competency, devotion, dedication,
concern, and professionalism for both midwifery and patients during the
hearing. 285 The Medical Board concluded that a licensed midwife who possesses a
relationship (albeit an informal one) with a California physician and surgeon as
referenced in the CLMPA "has feasibly and reasonably satisfied the ambit of the
Act":
In an effort to practice their art, virtually all of California's 109 licensed
midwives, including Respondent, have, with the cooperation of physicians
sympathetic to their plight and who seek to expand the options available to
patients, developed a relationship that involves collegial referral and
assistance, collaboration, and emergent assistance without direct or
accountable physician and surgeon supervision of licensed midwives. In an
effort to promote the efficacy of the Act, this tribunal concludes, at this
time, that a licensed midwife who possesses a relationship with a
California physician and surgeon as referenced herein has feasibly and
reasonably satisfied the ambit of the Act. Accordingly, cause does not exist
282 Id. at 714 & n.5.
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to revoke or suspend the license of Respondent pursuant to Business and
Professions Code section 2519(e), in conjunction with sections 2507(a) and
2507(b), for unprofessional conduct arising from lack of supervision as set
forth in Findings 13-14 and 17-23.286
The State of California did not charge Osmond with a violation of a criminal
provision. However, early in 2000, the State of California did charge Lori Jensen,
a lay midwife practicing in Orange County, with contributing to the death of an
infant by illegally injecting the laboring mother with Pitocin, a labor inducing
drug.287 The use of the drug violated the CLMPA provision prohibiting midwives
from using artificial or forcible means to assist childbirth. 288 When Jensen pled
guilty to contributing to the death of the infant, California obtained its first
successful criminal prosecution of a licensed midwife in the state. 2 89
E. Legislative Attempts to Eliminate the Physician Supervision Requirement for
Licensed Midwives
In 2000, the California Legislature introduced a new statute that would have
eliminated the physician supervision requirement for licensed midwives
[hereinafter 2000 Legislation].290 The introduced version would have redefined
the relationship between the licensed midwife and the physician as "consultative,"
reasoning that removing the supervision requirement would "remove a barrier for
physicians who wish to consult with licensed midwives and increase the quality
and safety of the care for both the mother and the baby."29 1  However, the
introduced version eventually was amended in committee to require the
continuance of the supervision requirement. 2 92
Although the supervision requirement was continued, the 2000 legislation
contained statements of important findings regarding the benefits of midwifery, an
acknowledgement that childbirth is a natural process, and a statement that a woman
has the right to choose her birth setting from those safely available to her.293 The
286 Id.
287 See Judy Silber & Richard Marosi, O.C. Midwife's Actions Contributed to Death of Baby,
Officials Say; Prosecutors Charge Her with Breaking the Law By Giving a Drug without a Doctor's
Supervision, Her Lawyer Says She Is Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at B 1.
288 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2507(b) (Deering 2004).
289 See Ex-Midwife Pleads Guilty in Baby's Death, L.A. TIMES, May 20,2000, at BS.
290 Act of Sept. 1, 2000, ch. 303, 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 303 (Deering), as introduced on
February 10, 2000.
291 See California Senate Rules Committee, Senate Analysis of SB 1479, at 4 (April 6, 2000); and
SB 1479 Midwifery Fact Sheet from Senator Liz Figueroa 3 (undated) (asserting that changing the
midwife-physician relationship from one of supervision to one of consultation would cause physicians to
feel "more free to communicate with midwives" and provide patients with "optimal health care in the
home environment").
292 See Act of Sept. 1, 2000, ch. 303, 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 303, § 4(b), at 2137 (Deering).
293 Id. Additional findings included a description of the midwifery model of care as one that
emphasizes informed consent and support throughout the birthing process, an assertion that studies
support the safety of midwifery care for low-risk women, and a statement that midwife-assisted home
birth is an important option for women. Id. § 4(c)-(e).
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2000 Legislation stated that "[n]umerous studies have associated professional
midwifery care with safety, good outcomes, and cost effectiveness in the United
Sates and other countries." 294  In addition, the 2000 Legislation specifically
rejected the California Supreme Court's decision in Bowland by stating that
"[e]very woman has a right to choose her birth setting from the full range of safe
options available in her community" and that "[t]he midwifery model of care is an
important option within comprehensive health care for women and their families
and should be a choice made available to all women who are appropriate for and
interested in home birth. ' 295 Those who viewed Bowland's rejection of the lay
midwives' constitutional right of privacy claims as "scandalous" 296 likely were
pleased by the specific findings set forth within the 2000 Legislation.
The 2000 Legislation also required midwives to disclose specific information
to their patients in order to ensure that the patients were giving their informed
consent to attendance by a midwife. The information to be disclosed orally and in
writing included the type of practice authorized by the midwife's license, the
definition and scope of midwifery, the definition of "supervision," the permitted
ratio of midwives to supervising physicians, those activities in which midwives are
not permitted to engage, a statement regarding whether the midwife carries liability
insurance, specific arrangements the midwife has made for transfer of care in case
of emergency, and a statement regarding how patients may report complaints to the
Medical Board of California.297 The midwife's written disclosure had to be signed
by the midwife and the client and a copy of the disclosure had to be placed in the
patient's medical records.2 98 Although the 2000 Legislation did not formally
remove the physician supervision requirement, the Legislation dispensed with the
requirement that midwives had to disclose the name of a specific physician who
would be updated on the case and take over care in the case of an emergency.299
VI. CONCLUSION
Historians have analyzed and interpreted birth statistics, medical textbooks,
minutes of medical society meetings, public health reports and many, many other
sources to identify the direct and indirect roles played by professional and
economic competition, class, race, and gender in physicians' opposition to
midwives and the transition in the United States from lay midwife-assisted home
births to physician-assisted hospital births. Parts III, IV, and V of this article
294 Id. § 4(d). The 2000 Legislation also includes the following specific findings: "California
studies suggest that low-risk women who choose a natural childbirth approach in an out-of-hospital
setting will experience as low a perinatal mortality as low-risk women who choose a hospital birth under
management of an obstetrician, including unfavorable results for transfer from the home to the hospital."
Id. § 4(d).
295 Id. § 4(b), (e).
296 Happe, supra note 66, at 726.
297 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2507(b)-(e), 2508(a)(2)-(4) (Deering 2004).
298 Id. § 2508(b).
299 Id. § 2508(a)(3).
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identify and discuss an additional source of material: the texts of Alabama,
Massachusetts, and California judicial opinions interpreting state regulation of lay
midwifery practices. In light of these texts, this Part VI addresses the following
questions: Why did the courts consistently defer to legislative findings that high
infant and maternal mortality rates justified stringent regulation of midwives? Why
did the courts continue to uphold statutory requirements for physician supervision
of midwives and statutes that restrict the practice of lay midwifery?
A. Judicial Deference to Legislative and Physician Conclusions Regarding Public
Health
A plain reading of the judicial opinions issued by the courts in Alabama,
Massachusetts, and California would appear to perpetuate the argument that the
practice of lay midwifery is unsafe, that midwives lack education and knowledge,
and that state restriction of lay midwifery was and is necessary to improve the
health of mothers and infants.
For example, in State v. Kimpel, the State of Alabama charged Toni Darlene
Kimpel in five separate indictments of practicing nurse midwifery without a license
in violation of Alabama's Act 499.300 Importantly, the court specifically
rationalized Act 499's effective ban on the practice of lay midwifery by stating that
the "protection of the safety of a mother and child during labor and delivery is a
legitimate government objective." 30 1  For more than one hundred years, the
"phasing out of traditional southern black midwives was said to be the key to
lowering high infant mortality rates." 30 2  Although infant mortality in Greene
County, Alabama was admittedly high, the rate of mortality did not consistently
correlate with percentages of midwife attended births.30 3 Indeed, Alice Forman,
who worked with Mrs. Smith in one of the public health clinics, noted that the high
mortality rates persisted even when the midwives attended few deliveries.
30 4
Importantly, however, the Kimpel court fails to mention any of the public health
studies, including studies like those published in the Alabama Medical Journal,
concluding that the "colored rate is lower than the white rate in maternal mortality
by 9 percent and neonatality by 35 percent," 30 5 thus suggesting a lack of
association between the lay midwives who delivered the majority of the black
population's babies and maternal and infant mortality. In summary, the Kimpel
court simply deferred to the Alabama Legislature's general finding that public
health required the elimination of the lay midwife without any serious analysis
regarding whether the public health truly was threatened by lay midwifery
practices.
300 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 991.
301 Id. at 994.
302 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 140.
303 Id. at 141-42.
304 Id. at 141-42.
305 Id. at 65-66.
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In addition, the Kimpel court either negligently misunderstood, or
intentionally misstated, the reason for the demise of the Alabama midwife. The
Kimpel court explains that "[a]ll those [midwives] who previously held the permits
have terminated their practice," 30 6 thus suggesting that the midwives themselves
ended their practices because the practice of midwifery was no longer viable or
clients were difficult to come by. However, Alabama midwives did not voluntarily
cease their practices; instead, public health officials refused to renew their permits
and directed each remaining lay midwife, by letter or in person, to discontinue her
practice. 30 7
In summary, the Kimpel court defers to both the Alabama Legislature's
general, but perhaps unsupported, conclusions regarding the association between
lay midwives and maternal and infant mortality and the need for regulation without
carefully scrutinizing the situation or noting studies that support the contrary view
and misrepresents the way in which midwives' practices were terminated.
Similarly, in the 1907 prosecution of Massachusetts midwife Hanna Porn, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts deferred to the testimony of physicians
who testified on behalf of the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine, as
well as to "medical and popular lexicographers," in adopting a theory that the
practice of midwifery was the same as the practice of obstetrics. 30 8 Similarly, in
the 1985 administrative action against registered nurse Janet Leigh in Leigh v.
Board of Registration, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarily
responded to several of Leigh's arguments with a statement that the 1975
legislation banning home deliveries by nurses bore a "reasonable and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general
welfare." 30 9 Similar to the Alabama court in Kimpel, the Leigh court also failed to
note studies showing, for example, that infants born in midwife Hanna Porn's
attendance were twice as likely to survive as infants born in the attendance of
physicians. 310 In summary, the Leigh court simply deferred to the Massachusetts'
Legislature's "preference that births attended by nonphysicians take place in
licensed facilities .... 311
Likewise, in the Supreme Court of California's Bowland decision, three
midwives from the Santa Cruz Birth Center were charged with the unlicensed
practice of medicine.3 12 The Supreme Court of California also deferred to the
California Legislature's conclusions that California residents need to be protected
"from persons who claim some experience in the healing arts but whose
306 Emphasis added.
307 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 134-35.
308 Porn, 82 N.E. at 31.
309 Leigh, 481 N.E.2d at 1354 (quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the
Necessaries of Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418 (Mass. 1940)).
310 Corcoran, supra note 66, at 649.
311 Leigh II, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
312 Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1081.
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qualifications have not been established by the receipt of a certificate." 3 13 Like the
other courts discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Supreme Court of
California did not scrutinize the Legislature's general conclusions despite statistics
available to it that would suggest the contrary.
In summary, the Alabama, Massachusetts, and California judicial opinions
perpetuate the argument that the practice of lay midwifery is unsafe, that midwives
lack education and knowledge, and that state restriction of lay midwifery is
necessary to improve the health of mothers and infants. The judicial opinions
perpetuated this argument by deferring to the legislatures' and physicians'
somewhat unsupported conclusions regarding regulation that was needed to
improve the health of the public without engaging in any type of analysis to
determine whether such regulation was needed.
In light of this information, one issue that arises is whether the legislatures'
and physicians' attempts to eliminate midwifery through administrative
disciplinary action and criminal prosecution were based solely on their beliefs that
midwifery was unsafe or, instead, were they motivated by other, more important,
factors.
B. The Force of Economic Competition
A review of the case law discussed in Parts III, IV, and V suggests that
physicians' and legislatures' focus on the need to eliminate lay midwifery to
improve the public health may be a disguised objection to the economic
competition of midwives.
For example, Part III shows that in the early twentieth-century, many
Alabama physicians did not object to sharing the childbirth work with midwives,
especially since many of the poorer patients served by the midwives did not even
have the money to pay for the lower-cost midwife-attended deliveries.3 14 Indeed,
most of Mrs. Smith's patients were poor, black women, many of whom could not
and did not pay Mrs. Smith for her midwifery services.3 15 Her competitor
physicians thus had no incentive to struggle for these non-paying clients. However,
when Mrs. Smith obtained a permit to attend deliveries of public health clinic
patients, her fees were established and easier to collect.3 16 As discussed in Part III,
once the midwives' fees increased to fifty dollars per delivery, the medical
establishment increased its efforts to terminate their practices: "When it got on up
there to fifty, that's when they wanted the midwives off."3 1 7
Similarly, in Alabama's Kimpel decision, the Mobile County indictments
313 Id. at 1088.
314 See supra Part II.
315 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 65.
316 Id. at 75.
317 Id. at 76-77.
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stressed the fact that the defendant midwife received "payment or other
consideration" in exchange for her midwifery services even though the receipt of
remuneration was not an element of an Act 499 violation.3 18
Moreover, in Massachusetts, economic competition also seemed to play an
important role in the strong opposition of the early twentieth-century physicians
and legislatures (and, hence, deferential judiciary) to the local midwives. In
Commonwealth v. Porn, it becomes apparent that cost was likely an important
factor in midwife Hanna Porn's clients' decision to use her.3 19 Porn only charged
between two and five dollars for an entire array of midwifery and nursing services,
whereas the local physicians charged three times that amount. 320 Again, although
establishing receipt of remuneration by a midwife was not a required element to
prove a violation of Massachusetts' 1894 Medical Practice Act, the Board of
Registration in Medicine emphasized that "Porn delivered many women in
childbirth for compensation...., ' '32 1 thus suggesting the Board's concern for the
amount of money she earned practicing midwifery.
Likewise, the Lawrence, Massachusetts, midwives who practiced in the early
twentieth-century also charged only five dollars for a similarly wide array of
midwifery and nursing services, and would accept payment of food and services as
"in kind" payments. 322 However, the local Lawrence physicians' going rate was
ten dollars, and they wanted their money in cash, not "in kind. 323
Moreover, the defendant midwife in Leigh argued that the 1975
Massachusetts legislation banning home deliveries illegally restrained trade in
violation of federal and Massachusetts antitrust law.32 4 Stated another way, the
defendant midwife's argument was that the Massachusetts legislation created a
physician monopoly over the available childbirth work. However, the Leigh court
summarily dismissed the midwife's claims, simply stating that the actions of both
the Massachusetts Legislature and, important to the instant decision, the
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine, were exempt from antitrust
liability because they were entitled to sovereign immunity.325 The Leigh court's
entitlement of sovereign immunity to the Board of Registration in Medicine, which
is composed of many physicians, demonstrates the power and influence held by the
Massachusetts medical establishment.
In conclusion, the Alabama and Massachusetts courts appear to emphasize
both the defendant midwives' receipt of remuneration (even when receipt of such
remuneration was not an element necessary to prove a statutory violation) and the
318 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 993.
319 Corcoran, supra note 66, at 649.
320 Id.
321 Porn, 82 N.E. at 31.
322 Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 387.
323 Id.
324 Leigh I, 506 N.E.2d at 94-95.
325 Id at 95.
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midwives' competitive fee schedules. Perhaps the defendant midwives'
competitive pricing provides one explanation for local physicians' strong
opposition to midwifery practices. Stated alternatively, if informally trained
midwives were capable of delivering children safely (and sometimes even more
safely than local physicians) and for a significantly reduced fee, then perhaps the
local physicians were concerned because the midwives threatened the physicians'
efforts to earn high fees and professionalize obstetrics. Joseph B. De Lee, the
prominent nineteenth-century obstetrician, complained about this very possibility:
"[A]s long as the medical profession tolerates that brand of infamy, the midwife,
the public will not be brought to realize that there is high art in obstetrics and that it
must pay as well for it as surgery." 326
Indeed:
In 1990, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that
"female with delivery" was the most common hospital discharge category.
Since hospital birth is a major source of revenue for most public and
private hospitals, it is understandable that hospital associations join with
physicians to lobby against out-of-hospital births. 327
C. The Force of Professional Competition
This section discusses the professional, or status, competition that existed
between physicians and midwives. In many of the decisions discussed in Parts III,
IV, and V, the defendant midwives unsuccessfully argued that the application of
the restrictive midwifery regulations resulted in violations of their right to equal
protection under the laws. For example, in Alabama's Kimpel decision, Ms.
Kimpel's third and final challenge to her indictment was that Act 499 violated her
right to equal protection under the law.3 28 However, the court responded by
asserting that the right to choose a profession is only governed by the low rational
basis standard of review and, therefore, since the State of Alabama offered a
rational explanation for its legislation--that the protection of the safety of a mother
and child during labor was a legitimate government objective-the legislation must
be upheld.32 9
Similarly, in Massachusetts' Commonwealth v. Porn decision, defendant
midwife Hanna Porn also argued that the 1894 Medical Practice Act's midwifery
ban was unconstitutional as legislation that had a disparate impact on midwives as a
profession. 330 In response, the court summarily stated that, "[the statute's] validity
cannot be questioned on this ground. The maintenance of a high standard of
professional qualifications for physicians is of vital concern to the public health,
326 Joseph B. De Lee, Progress Toward Ideal Obstetrics, in THE AMERICAN MIDWIFE DEBATE: A
SOURCEBOOK ON ITS MODERN ORIGINS 105, (Judy Barrett Litoff ed., 1986).
327 Suarez, supra note 16 at 321-22.
328 Kimpel, 665 So.2d at 994.
329 Id.
330 Porn, 82 N.E. at 31.
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and reasonable regulations to this end do not contravene any provision of the state
or federal Constitution." 33 1 Here, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
concern with maintaining the high status of the medical profession, vis-A-vis the
status of the midwifery profession, is evident. Moreover, in Leigh (another
Massachusetts' opinion), the defendant midwife Janet Leigh also argued a violation
of her right to equal protection and the court summarily responded that "[t]he
Legislature has expressed its preferences that births attended by nonphysicians take
place in licensed facilities with the assistance of certified nurse midwives ... "332
Finally, in the California administrative decision, In re Osborn, the
Administrative Law Judge, although not requiring strict adherence to California's
physician supervision requirement, did perpetuate the requirement that midwives
obtain physician collaboration in their practices. 333 Accordingly, In re Osborn
subordinates California's "professionalized" licensed lay midwives to the
physicians with whom they are required to consult and collaborate. 334 To the
extent a particular midwife is unable to find a collaborating physician, she will be
unable to practice midwifery legally in California.335 Thus, physicians can place
midwives in a subordinate position in the health care professional hierarchy by
refusing to collaborate with them or by collaborating with them but controlling the
way in which they practice. One could interpret the physician supervision
requirement as one way in which the California medical establishment continues to
belittle midwives' training, experience, and expertise. Finally, the 2000 California
legislation requires midwifes to disclose substantially more information to their
patients than obstetricians are required to disclose in similar circumstances, 336
which could be interpreted as giving obstetricians an unfair competitive advantage
compared to midwives.
In summary, the Massachusetts, Alabama, and California legislation and
judicial opinions discussed above appear to favor the continued professionalization
and establishment of higher standards for physician obstetrics, while opposing the
professionalization of midwifery. One of the most direct statements opposing the
professionalization and "legal status" of midwifery was made by obstetrician
Charles Ziegler:
My own feeling is that the great danger lies in the possibility of attempting
to educate the midwife and in licensing her to practice midwifery, giving
her thereby a legal status which later cannot perhaps be altered. If she once
become a fixed element in our social and economic system, as she now is
in the British Isles and on the Continent, we may never be able to get rid of
331 Id. (emphasis added).
332 Leigh II, 506 N.E.2d at 93.
333 In re Osborn, supra note 283.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2507(b)-(e), 2508(a)(2)-(4) (Deering 2004).
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her.337
D. Issues of Class and.Race
Although not specifically identified by the Alabama, Massachusetts, or
California courts, class and racial issues may have played a role in the judiciaries'
continued deference to midwifery practice restrictions. The Kimpel court's failure
to note the disparate impact of Alabama Act 499 on the 150 remaining practicing
midwives, all of whom were black, is significant. Had Kimpel's attorneys properly
identified and argued Act 499's impact on a suspect class and persuaded the court
to apply the more stringent strict scrutiny level of review, the outcome of the case
may have been different.
Similarly, although not specifically stated in Commonwealth v. Porn, it is
significant that Gardner, Massachusetts midwife Hanna Porn was born in Finland
and that almost all of Porn's clients were working class women from Finnish,
Russian, and Swedish communities. 33 8  The Italian surnames of the three
prominent Lawrence, Massachusetts, midwives (Pedrazzini, DeMarco, and
Carpenito) suggests their immigrant status as well.339
Perhaps midwifery's demise in Alabama and Massachusetts was due in part
to shifting social attitudes regarding race and class, instead of true concern
regarding the health of the public. Perhaps black and immigrant midwives became
an easy target for white upper-class physicians who were unable to support their
opposition to midwifery with sound public health arguments. Instead, physicians
may have found it easier to support their propositions by using the prevalent
stereotype of the dirty and ignorant midwife and emphasizing the unhealthy living
environments in which many low income black and immigrant families lived.340
As discussed in Part II, white Alabama physicians in the 1940's directed specific
campaigns towards white women in an attempt to persuade them not to have their
births be attended by black midwives, despite many white women's respect for the
skills of their black midwives.34 1 Similarly, through aggressive campaigns and
journal articles, the American Medical Association attempted to convince the
public that midwives were "backward, dirty, ignorant, and incapable of handling an
event that was viewed as rarely normal and always frought. [sic] with danger." 342
337 Charles Edward Ziegler, The Elimination of the Midwife, 60 JAMA 32-38 (1913).
338 Corcoran, supra note 66, at 649.
339 See Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at 383.
340 Lowis & McCaffery, supra note 60, at 23.
341 Id. at 21, 67.
342 LITOFF, supra note 5, at 429.
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E. Gender Issues
The Alabama, Massachusetts, and California opinions discussed in Parts III,
IV, and V do not directly suggest that gender played a role in the demise of
midwifery in those states. However, one could argue that the independent practice
of midwifery ran contrary to late nineteenth century views relating to the
appropriate domestic role, and passive character, of women. Midwifery required
the midwife to leave her home and apply her experience to a constantly changing,
potentially dangerous, and probably exciting environment. As demonstrated by
Maine midwife Martha Ballard and, to an extent, by Mrs. Smith, Hanna Porn, and
the Lawrence, Massachusetts, midwives, a successful midwifery practice was one
way for women to obtain financial independence and intellectual satisfaction. 34 3
Interestingly, when Act 499 effectively ended the legal practice of lay midwifery in
Alabama, Mrs. Smith was forced to accept work as a live-in nurse, taking care of
white infants in their homes.344 Although nursing jobs with well-to-do white
families provided more money than delivering babies to poor black women in
Alabama, Mrs. Smith characterized such work as submissive and domestic
compared to her independent midwifery practice. 345
In addition, and although not specifically stated by the Alabama,
Massachusetts, and California courts, the courts' continual refusal to acknowledge
the skills of the defendant women midwives and their positive health outcomes
suggests that the women midwives' experiential knowledge was both subordinate
to the male physician's new scientific knowledge and rejected as a means of
establishing professional and legal standing.34 6
In conclusion, an analysis of the texts of Alabama, Massachusetts, and
California judicial opinions demonstrates that a confluence of professional,
economic, class, race, and gender forces may have played a role in the judiciaries'
continued deference to state legislative preferences for physician-controlled
childbirth and stringent regulation of midwives.
343 See SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1; Porn, 82 N.E. at 31; Declercq & Lacroix, supra note 5, at
383.
344 SMITH & HOLMES, supra note 1, at 146.
345 Id. at 121.
346 LAY, supra note 67, 172-73.
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